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THE BAKALY DEBACLE: THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN IDGH-
PROFILE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 
JUDE R. O'SULUVAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
When I was invited to discuss the likely legal fallout of the Clinton 
"scandals," I was hard pressed to isolate a theme that other authors 
participating in this Symposium had not already explored or would 
not now effectively address. I wish, then, to take a slight detour, in 
hopes that it will be both a worthwhile one for debate and ultimately 
pertinent to the legacy of the independent counsel statute and the 
Clinton "scandals." My subject concerns the case of Charles G. Bakaly, 
III, former spokesperson for Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. 
Mr. Bakaly was tried in the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia on charges of criminal contempt.} The case is founded on 
allegations that Mr. Bakaly, in certain court filings made on behalf of 
the Office of the Independent Counsel (OIC), lied when he denied 
leaking information to a reporter for the New York Times, Don Van 
NattaJr.2 As of this writing, the case has not been resolved,3 but even 
© Copyright Julie R. O'Sullivan and Maryland Law Review, Inc. 2001. 
* John Carroll Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. AB., Stanford 
University;J.D., Cornell University. Former Associate Counsel in the Whitewater Investiga-
tion (Jan. 1994-0ct. 1994) under regulatory Independent Counsel Robert B. Fiske,Jr., and 
statutory Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. I should note that illustrative cites through-
out this piece are generally to the Washington Post for the simple reason that I read it every 
day; I am fervently hoping that the views expressed herein will not cause a cancellation of 
my subscription. I would like to thank my patient and diligent research assistants, Margaret 
Whitney and Chad Pimental, for their help in the preparation of this Article. I would also 
like to thank Benjamin Wittes who (in his strictly personal and not professional capacity) 
provided me thoughtful comments and posed the question addressed at the very end of 
this Article, thus inspiring me to think and write about this topic in the first instance. 
Thanks, too, to the other reporters who (again acting as individuals and not as representa-
tives of news organizations) reviewed and offered invaluable comments on drafts of this 
piece. 
1. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6, 8 (D.D.C. 2000). Mr. Bakaly 
was charged pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1994), which states that ural court of the 
United States shall have the power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, 
such contempt of its authority, and none other, as ... [mlisbehavior of any person in its 
presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice." 
2. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 8-16 (detailing the facts sur-
rounding the charges brought against Mr. Bakaly). 
3. Eds.-Mter this Article was submitted for publication, but before the editorial pro-
cess was completed, the district court acquitted Mr. Bakaly of all charges. See id. at 8. 
Because it was too late in the process to perform substantive revisions, and because the 
149 
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at this point it is interesting to touch upon the questions it raises 
about the interaction between actors in the criminal process and the 
press in a scandal-driven environment. 
Others have examined why prosecutors or law enforcement 
agents may be inclined to "leak" information regarding ongoing crim-
inal investigations, documented the rules that govern federal prosecu-
tors' interaction with the press in such circumstances, outlined the 
difficulties encountered in enforcing those rules, and critiqued the 
performance of Mr. Starr's office in this regard. 4 In other words, the 
dynamic as it flows from governmental actors to the press has been 
scrutinized. I would like to suggest that a more searching examina-
tion be conducted of the press's role, and perhaps its responsibilities, 
in this context. Because I am neither a journalist nor a First Amend-
ment scholar (and have committed to an article, not a book), I do not 
undertake exhaustively to cover this topic, or even to answer many of 
the questions I raise. I write in hopes that others will find the perspec-
tive of a criminal lawyer interesting in the ongoing debate regarding 
the place of the press in the Lewinsky affair and in high-profile or 
scandal-driven criminal investigations generally.5 
court's decision does not affect most of the discussion in this piece, that decision is not 
reflected in the body of this Article. Some footnotes have been altered to reflect the 
court's findings, and others have been added to document the court's holdings on the 
substantive counts discussed. The court also made one observation regarding the sourcing 
of the New York Times article at issue, which is quoted infra note 170. 
4. See, e.g., John Q. Barrett, The Leak and the Craft: A Hard Line Proposal to Stop Unac-
countable Disclosures of Law Enforcement Information, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 613 (1999); Daniel 
C. Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 
339 (1999); Ronald D. Rotunda, Independent Counsel and the Charges of Leaking: A Brief Case 
Study, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 869 (1999). For a general discussion of the defense's increasing 
reliance on public relations strategies, and the ethical implications of such strategies, see 
Jonathan M. Moses, Note, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public opin-
ion, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1811 (1995). 
5. Because I discuss journalistic sourcing at some length, I should perhaps address my 
own choices of sources. I have relied throughout on perspectives offered by press com-
mentators and editorial writers. I am cautioned by one highly respected reporter who 
reviewed an earlier draft that equating editorial comments by news organizations with the 
attitudes of reporters and editors may be misleading. It has been suggested to me that 
news management and editorial writers are viewed by many reporters as part of a commu-
nity establishment from which they are proudly divorced. My reliance on these sources 
stems from their relevance, my own lack of experience, and the fact that most reporters 
seem to lack the time and the inclination for "hand-wringing" about issues such as those 
raised within. To the extent that I was able to divine from beat reporters their attitudes 
about some of the issues raised, however, I have tried to reflect them within. 
I should also note that, from what I am told, some reporters would view my entire 
enterprise in this Article as something of a fool's errand. I am assured that many journal-
ists would say that they do not get the news out to win popularity contests or even public 
approval. Good reporters feel no obligation to help make governmental processes work; 
they are not, in practicing their craft, looking for good citizenship awards. They attempt to 
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I. THE BAKALY CAsE 
A. Background 
On January 31, 1999, the New York Times published a front-page 
story authored by Don Van Natta Jr. and entitled "Starr Is Weighing 
Whether to Indict Sitting President."6 The lead for the story read: 
"The independent counsel, Kenneth W. Starr, has concluded that he 
has the constitutional authority to seek a grand jury indictment of 
President Clinton before he leaves the White House in January 2001, 
several associates of Mr. Starr said this week."7 The article then went 
on to report on discussions allegedly occurring within the OIC con-
cerning the options open to that office,S which were said to be to de-
cline a criminal prosecution against the President; to indict, but 
postpone the trial; to indict the President under seal; or to indict after 
the President leaves office.9 The article constantly cited as the source 
of its information "several associates of Mr. Starr," and explicitly 
stated: "Charles G. Bakaly 3d, the spokesman for Mr. Starr, declined 
to discuss the matter. 'We will not discuss the plans of this office or 
the plans of the grand jury in any way, shape or form,' he said."lo 
The day after the article appeared, the President and the White 
House filed a motion seeking an Order to Show Cause why the OIC, 
or individuals in that office, should not be held in contempt for violat-
ing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e),1l which requires attor-
neys for the government to maintain the secrecy of "matters occurring 
be accurate and honest in recounting the facts and in their sourcing not because they 
worry about the effects that their reports will have on sources, the functioning of the crimi-
nal justice system, or the government, but rather because of their professional pride in 
their vocation. If reporting the news is done well, it may well have consequences, some of 
which may be adverse to individuals or institutions. But, I am told, many journalists believe 
that as long as they have done their job, the unintended consequences are someone else's 
problem. 
This is a perspective that is profoundly foreign to me as an academic and lawyer (that 
is, a professional hand-wringer). It may well be, then, that the only members of the fourth 
estate interested in my comments will be press commentators, editorial writers, press man-
agement, and the odd reporter here and there-an audience I would be happy to have. I 
hope, however, that just as I have found challenging and interesting the profoundly differ-
ent perspectives of the journalists with whom I have conversed while writing this piece, 
journalists will find my comments worthy of at least some reflection. 
6. Don Van Natta Jr., The President's Trial: The Independent Counsel; Starr Is Weighing 





11. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6, 8 (D.D.C. 2000). 
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before the grand jury."12 In addition to the lead sentence quoted 
above, the President and the White House identified the following 
portions of the Times story as containing information divulged by the 
OIC in violation of Rule 6(e): 
- "While the President's legal team has fought in the Senate 
chamber for the President's political survival, Mr. Starr and 
his prosecutors have actively considered whether to ask a 
Federal grandjury here to indict Mr. Clinton before his term 
expires, said Mr. Starr's associates, who spoke on the condi-
tion of anonymity." 
- "Inside the Independent Counsel's Office, a group of 
prosecutors believes that not long after the Senate trial con-
cludes, Mr. Starr should ask the grand jury of 23 men and 
women hearing the case against Mr. Clinton to indict him on 
charges of peIjury and obstruction of justice, the associates 
said. The group wants to charge Mr. Clinton with lying 
under oath in his Jones deposition in January 1998 and in his 
grand jury testimony in August, the associates added." 
- "Since early last year, the constitutional question has been 
exhaustively researched by two constitutional law experts 
who are paid consultants to Mr. Starr: Ronald D. Rotunda of 
the University of Illinois Law School and William Kelley of 
the University of Notre Dame. Both Mr. Rotunda and Mr. 
Kelley have concluded that the 1997 Supreme Court deci-
sion in the Paula Jones case suggests that the Constitution 
does not prohibit a prosecutor from seeking an indictment, 
trial and conviction of a sitting President, the associates 
said."13 
The OIC hired outside counsel, Donald Bucklin, to represent it 
in the Order to Show Cause litigation and asked the FBI to investigate 
the alleged Rule 6(e) violation.14 To respond to the Order to Show 
Cause motion, Mr. Bucklin and an associate met on several occasions 
with Mr. Bakaly.15 Mr. Bakaly had served as Counselor to Mr. Starr 
since April 13, 1998, and in that capacity his responsibilities included 
" 'addressing strategic and public policy issues, and communication of 
the work of the [OIC] to the general public."'16 He also served as 
12. FED. R. CRlM. P. 6(e) (2). 
13. In reGrandJury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 9 (quoting Van Natta, supra note 6, 
at 1). 
14. See id. 
15. Id. at 10. 
16. Id. (quoting Declaration of Charles G. Bakaly, III, 'I 1, In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Bakaly Declaration]). 
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"'the OIC's spokesman and contact person with the news media. "'17 
The attorneys prepared a declaration for Mr. Bakaly, which he then 
reviewed and amended. IS On February 9, 1999, Mr. Bakaly swore to 
and signed the declaration. I9 It was filed with the court in support of 
the OIC's Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for an Order to 
Show Cause (Opposition Brief).20 The Opposition Brief made two ar-
guments. First, the OIC contended that the Times article did not dis-
close "matters occurring before the grand jury."21 Second, the OIC 
argued that it was "not the source of the disclosures complained of by 
movants."22 The OIC cited Mr. Bakaly's declaration in arguing that 
the disclosures complained of by the White House and the President 
did not originate with persons inside the 01C.23 
Throughout February 1999, the OIC's internal investigation con-
tinued.24 During this period, Mr. Bakaly met with various OIC attor-
neys, counsel for the OIC, and FBI agents to discuss his conversations 
with Mr. Van Natta.25 On March 8, 1999, the OIC filed an amend-
ment to its Opposition Brief, withdrawing the Bakaly Declaration and 
the portion of the Opposition Brief that stated that the OIC was "not 
the source of the disclosures in [the Times] article."26 The asserted 
basis for the amendment was that: 
[r] ecently, the FBI informed undersigned counsel that Mr. 
Bakaly had acknowledged to its investigators that he pro-
vided Mr. Van Natta some of the information reported in the 
New York Times article or confirmed the accuracy of informa-
tion that Mr. Van Natta already possessed and attributed to 
sources outside the 01C.27 
17. Id. (quoting Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, ~ 1). 
18. Id.; see also Charles G. Bakaly, Ill's Pre-Trial Brief at 5-13, In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Bakaly's Pre-Trial Brief] (detailing Mr. 
Bakaly's interaction with counsel and alterations made to his declaration). 
19. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 10. 
20. Id.; see Opposition of the United States of America to the Motion for Order to Show 
Cause, In re GrandJury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Opposi-
tion Brief]. 
21. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 12. 
22. Id. 
23. See id. 
24. See id. at 11. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 12 (citing Amendment to the Opposition of the OIC to the Motion for Order 
to Show Cause and Withdrawal of Argument and Supporting Declaration at 1-2, In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Amendment to 
Opposition Brief]). 
27. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Amendment to Opposition Brief, supra note 
26, at 1-2). 
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The amendment also informed the court that the OIC had referred 
the matter to the Department of Justice (DO]). 28 
On March 25, 1999, the district court issued an Order to Show 
Cause why the OIC should not be held in contempt for violating Rule 
6 ( e), finding that one passage in the Times article did disclose matters 
occurring before the grand jury. 29 The court further ordered that Mr. 
Bakaly "'appear at a hearing to address the serious allegation that he 
filed a materially false declaration intended to mislead this Court and 
to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for his con-
duct."'3o At the request of the DO], the Order to Show Cause was 
stayed pending the DOl's investigation.31 
On July 13, 1999, the DO] notified the court that it would not 
prosecute Mr. Bakaly and suggested that "'the alleged misconduct 
committed by Mr. Bakaly can best be addressed and remedied 
through the contempt proceedings already initiated by the Court.' "32 
The DO] further suggested that: 
"in light of the nature of the allegations against Mr. Bakaly 
and the sanctions that would likely be imposed upon him if 
he were found guilty by the Court, ... Mr. Bakaly should be 
provided the procedural protections of the criminal law ... 
and the contempt proceedings therefore should be consid-
ered criminal rather than civil in nature. "33 
The DO] also "advised the Court that ajury trial was not required 
because, should Mr. Bakaly be found guilty, DO] would not recom-
mend a term of imprisonment in excess of six months."34 On July 14, 
28. Id. (quoting Amendment to Opposition Brief, supra note 26, at 1-2). 
29. Id. at 12 (citing Order to Show Cause at 5-6, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. 
Supp. 2d 6 (D. D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Order to Show Cause)). The one passage was: 
"Inside the Independent Counsel's Office, a group of prosecutors believes that 
not long after the Senate trial concludes, Mr. Starr should ask the grand jury of 23 
men and women hearing the case against Mr. Clinton to indict him on charges of 
peIjury and obstruction of justice, the associates said. The group wants to charge 
Mr. Clinton with lying under oath in his Jones deposition in January 1998 and in 
his grand jury testimony in August, the associates added." 
Id. (quoting Order to Show Cause, supra, at 5-6, quoting in turn Van Natta, supra note 6, at 
1) . 
30. Id. at 13 (quoting Order to Show Cause, supra note 29, at 3). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. (quoting Letter from Michael Horowitz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to 
the Honorable Norma Holloway Johnson, Chief Judge, United States District Court, Dis-
trict of Columbia 1 (July 13, 1999) [hereinafter Letter from Michael Horowitz)). 
33. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Letter from Michael Horowitz, supra 
note 32, at 1). 
34. Id. (citing Letter from Michael Horowitz, supra note 32, at 1, citing in turn Cheffv. 
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 378 (1966». 
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1999, the district court lifted its stay of the contempt proceedings and 
adopted the DOl's recommendations.35 The court announced that 
the contempt proceedings would be criminal in nature and that the 
DOJ would be appointed to prosecute the contempt charges against 
Mr. Bakaly and the OIC.36 
The OIC appealed the court's March 25 and July 14 orders.37 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit reversed as to the OIC, holding that the one passage in the Times 
article cited by the district court as the foundation for its Order to 
Show Cause against the OlC38 was in fact "not Rule 6(e) material."39 
In short, none of the information contained in the article that was as-
serted to constitute grand jury material covered by Rule 6(e) was 
found to be subject to the secrecy requirements of that rule.40 
Nonetheless, the contempt case against Mr. Bakaly alone then 
proceeded on the basis of the Government's Amended Notice of Es-
sential Facts Constituting Criminal Contempt, filed pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 (b) .41 The case was tried without a 
jury before Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson, and, as of this writ-
ing, the Judge has yet to issue an opinion.42 In discussing the sub-
stance of the case, then, I will rely on the submissions of the parties. 
In particular, I will largely accept as true the factual assertions of the 
Government, although not the inferences and conclusions it draws 
from those facts. My purpose in accepting the Goverment's statement 
of facts is to demonstrate why I believe that, even assuming the worst 
35. Id. at 14 (citing Order of July 14, 1999, at 2, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. 
Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Order of July 14)). 
36. Id. (citing Order of July 14, supra note 35, at 2). 
37. Id. 
38. See supra note 29 (quoting the passage in the Nw York Times article, the disclosure 
of which the district court found to have violated Rule 6(e». 
39. In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
40. See id. at 1001-05 (discussing why disclosure of the material contained in the Times 
article did not constitute a violation of Rule 6(e». 
41. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 14. On November 29, 1999, the 
DOJ issued its Notice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) (providing 
for disposition of criminal contempt upon notice and hearing). In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, Misc. No. 99-38, at 13 (D.D.C.July 12, 2000) (mem.) (citing Government's Notice of 
Essential Facts Constituting Criminal Contempt, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 
2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Government's Notice of Essential Facts)). On June 23, 
2000, the Government filed an Amended Notice of Essential Facts Constituting Criminal 
Contempt, also pursuant to Rule 42(b), specifying particular falsehoods alleged to be olr 
structive. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (citing Amended Notice of 
Essential Facts Constituting Criminal Contempt l' 12-14, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 
117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Amended Notice)). 
42. See supra note 3. 
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case for the defense, this was a matter that in a less highly charged 
context probably would not have been pursued. 
It appears clear, at least from the Government's papers, that Mr. 
Bakaly spoke extensively with Mr. Van Natta and provided him with 
information and confirmation of information that appeared in the 
Times article.43 In a statement signed by Mr. Bakaly, he explained that 
he "aggressively sought to direct the article in a way that would protect 
the office against future attacks and 'set the stage' for our future work 
including the possible criminal prosecution of the President regard-
less of the outcome of the Senate impeachment trial."44 Although 
both sides agree that Mr. Bakaly admitted to the ole (and derivatively 
to the court) certain of the help he had provided Mr. Van Natta, the 
Government's submission also indicates that Mr. Bakaly did not ini-
tially disclose to the ole or its counsel all of the assistance he had 
rendered.45 Whether this was due to an initial failure of recollection, 
a mistaken belief that the ole and its counsel wished to know only 
whether he provided grand jury material to Mr. Van Natta, or a desire 
to deceive them as to his role is far less clear. 
As the discussion that follows this case summary evidences, I 
have-to put it mildly-serious reservations about the wisdom and 
propriety of any prosecutor's office engaging in these types of off-the-
record, "spinning" conversations with reporters. I certainly do not 
condone lying to any court in any form or for any reason. The ques-
tion I examine here, however, is not whether Mr. Bakaly should have 
been talking to Mr. Van Natta. And it is not, for present purposes, 
whether he could or should have been more forthcoming. It is 
whether Mr. Bakaly deserves criminal sanction on the basis of the al-
legedly false and misleading statements charged by the Government. 
B. The Charges Against Mr. Bakaly 
In successive rounds of briefing, the parties have engaged in care-
ful and detailed discussion of the charges brought and the evidence 
presented at trial. Recounting their analyses would unduly tax read-
43. See Government's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" 8-52, at 3-
15, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Govern-
ment's Proposed Findings of Fact] (describing Mr. Bakaly's statements recounting the 
information he provided or confirmed to Mr. Van Natta). 
44. Government's Exhibit 14, 1. 4, at 3, In reGrandJury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6 
(D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Government's Exhibit 14] (quoted in Government's Proposed 
Findings of Fact, supra note 43, at 14). 
45. See Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 'lI1 8-52, at 3-15 (dis-
cussing Mr. Bakaly's initial disclosures in his Declaration and his subsequent disclosures to 
OIC and FBI investigators). 
HeinOnline -- 60 Md. L. Rev. 157 2001
2001] THE PRESS AND HIGH-PROFILE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 157 
ers' patience. I therefore will attempt to summarize the basic issues, I 
hope without doing too much violence to the subtleties of the case. It 
is my belief that the case ultimately revolves around two sets of 
charges.46 
First, the Government charged that Mr. Bakaly lied in making the 
following underscored statement in his declaration:47 
During a conversation with Mr. Van Natta on either January 
28 or 30, 1999, it became apparent that he was going to pro-
ceed with the article. I expressed my concerns over how he 
intended to source the information that he had described to 
me as coming from outside the Ole. I feared that informa-
tion about the purported views of Judge Starr and some 
group within the OIC would be perceived as originating 
from within the Office. Mr. Van Natta again assured me that 
his sources were outside the OIC, that he was "working on 
his sourcing" and that he intended to make it clear in his 
article that his sources were not within the OIC. I also ex-
pressed concern over the timing of his article-during the 
Senate impeachment trial-and that the OIC would once 
46. The Government brought four counts against Mr. Bakaly. See In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 14-16 (quoting Amended Notice, supra note 41, 1'1 12-14). 
The charge discussed first (above) relates to one count set forth in Amended Notice 'I 
12(c). See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 15-16 (quoting the relevant 
charge). The charges discussed second (above) relate to two counts set forth in Amended 
Notice n 12(a) and 12(b). See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (quot-
ing the relevant charges). Finally, the Government alleged in Amended Notice '113 that: 
Mr. Bakaly's knowing misrepresentations and knowing failure to inform [Ole 
counsel] and Ole personnel about his contacts with Van Natta caused the follow-
ing materially false and misleading statement to appear on page 13 of the Ole's 
Opposition Brief: "Mr. Van Natta further told Mr. Bakaly that all his information 
carne from sources 'outside' the Ole." 
Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, , 67, at 26 (quoting Opposition 
Brief, supra note 20, at 13, and discussing Amended Notice, supra note 41, 'I 13). Defense 
counsel argue that "Mr. Bakaly was not involved in the preparation of the Ole brief in 
opposition to the motion for an order to show cause, and did not see the brief, or any draft 
of the brief, prior to the brief being filed with the Court." Bakaly's Pre-Trial Brief, supra 
note 18, at 13. I see nothing in the Government's Proposed Findings of Fact to gainsay this 
statement. Instead, the Government argues that it was "fully foreseeable" that the ole 
would rely on Mr. Bakaly's declaration in preparing its brief, and thus he should be charge-
able with this allegedly false statement. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra 
note 43, , 67, at 27. My own view is that the causal nexus here is very attenuated and that, 
absent other strong counts, a declarant should not be criminally pursued for the overstate-
ments made by counsel over which he had no control. Further, this count rises and, I 
submit, falls on the disposition of the other substantive charges. Accordingly, I do not 
treat this count in text. 
47. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 15-16 ("'At the time that Mr. 
Bakaly made the ... underlined statement and representation he knew that it was false and 
misleading ... .'" (quoting Amended Notice, supra note 41, , 12(c»). 
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agam be unfairly criticized for interfering in the Senate's 
business. Mr. Van Natta said that he had not thought of that 
as an issue.48 
It is worth noting (for purposes of later discussion) that the Gov-
ernment did not force Mr. Van Natta to testify regarding the truth of 
this passage. Thus, there was no direct evidence introduced that Mr. 
Van Natta did not say that which Mr. Bakaly attributed to him in the 
underscored sentence. The Government argued, however, that the 
underscored statement "conveys, and was intended to convey, the im-
pression that Mr. Bakaly simply was not one of the unnamed 'associ-
ates' of Mr. Starr in the article," an impression the Government 
contends was false. 49 
Perhaps this is the impression left by a quick read, but it is cer-
tainly not the most natural reading of the statement in context. Fairly 
read, the assertion that Mr. Van Natta's sources were "outside the 
ole" refers only to the sources of the information in the two 
sentences that precede the underscored portion of Mr. Bakaly's decla-
ration. Mr. Bakaly in fact amended a draft of this paragraph, pre-
pared by ole counsel to make clear that the information he was 
referring to was limited to the specific information that Mr. Van Natta 
had described to Mr. Bakalyas coming from outside the Ole-that is, 
that Mr. Starr had recently concluded that he had the authority to 
indict a sitting president and that a group of ole prosecutors favored 
indictment. 50 Indeed, the person who drafted the sentence-the 
OIC's attorney, Mr. Bucklin-testified that this limited interpretation 
of the amended sentence was intended.51 Because it appears uncon-
tested that Mr. Van Natta did indeed have at least one other source 
telling him about the purported views of Mr. Starr and some group of 
prosecutors within the Ole, there is no evidence to suggest that Mr. 
Bakaly's characterization of Mr. Van Natta's assurances was false. 52 
48. Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16,1: 11, at 3-4 (underscore added). 
49. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 1: 66, at 25. The Govern-
ment further stated that "the entire thrust of Mr. Bakaly's declaration was to convince the 
Court that he provided no information to Mr. Van Natta other than the specific items 
disclosed in the declaration." Id. 
50. See Charles G. Bakaly, Ill's Post-Trial Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law'l! 90, at 33, In reGrandJury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter 
Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact] (setting forth the amended version of this paragraph). 
51. Id. , 92, at 34. 
52. Eds.-The district court found that "lilt is overly broad to read the statement in 
Mr. Bakaly's declaration as denying that he was the source at all for Mr. Van Natta .... [A] 
fair reading of this statement limits it to 'information about the purported views of Judge 
Starr and some group within the OIC.'" In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 
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Second, the Government charged that Mr. Bakaly lied in telling 
the court in his declaration that he had not discussed "non-public" 
matters with Mr. Van Natta,53 and that he similarly lied when he stated 
that he "refused to confirm or comment on what Judge Starr or the 
OIC was thinking or doing."54 
The Government relied on a number of alleged communications 
to prove these charges: (1) Mr. Bakaly confirmed to Mr. Van Natta the 
four options considered by the OIC regarding the possible indictment 
of President Clinton; (2) Mr. Bakaly told Mr. Van Natta that a pexjury 
count based on the President's deposition in the Jones lawsuit was a 
stronger case than the pexjury count being tried in the Senate; (3) Mr. 
Bakaly told Mr. Van Natta, when discussing the persons Mr. Bakaly 
believed to be the sources of Mr. Van Natta's information, that Profes-
sor Rotunda was not in the office much and that Mr. Udolf left the 
OIC in April or May 1998, and may be biased against the OIC; (4) Mr. 
Bakaly told Mr. Van Natta that Mr. Starr relies quite a bit on the ad-
32 (quoting Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 'I 11). The court held that this statement 
was not proved false beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
53. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (quoting Amended Notice, 
supra note 41, 'Ii 12(a), 12(b), at 5-6). The Government alleged in Amended Notice, 
12(a) that Mr. Bakaly lied in making the fol1owing underscored statement: 
"I next recall a conversation with Mr. Van Natta on this subject on or aboutJanu-
ary 21, 1999. This occurred just a few days after an article by Jill Abramson ap-
peared in the New Yom Times. Ms. Abramson's article addressed possible trials of 
the President and others after the conclusion of the Senate impeachment pro-
ceeding. . .. Consistent with the position I took with Mr. Van Natta, I declined to 
discuss non-public matters with Ms. Abramson, and her article states: 'Charles G. 
Bakaly, 3d, a spokesman for the Independent Counsel's Office, would not com-
ment on any indictment speculation ... .'" 
Id. 'I 12(a) (underscore added) (quoting Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 'I 6, at 2, quot-
ing in tum Jill Abramson, Ideas & Trends: No Exit; The Trial May End, But the Trials WiU Go 
On, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1999, § 4, at 1). The central question with respect to this count is 
whether Mr. Bakaly did in fact discuss "non-public" matters with Mr. Van Natta. 
54. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (quoting Amended Notice, 
supra note 41, 'I 12(b), quoting in tum Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 'I 8, at 3). The 
Government alleged in Amended Notice 'I 12(b) that Mr. Bakaly knowingly made the un-
derscored false and misleading statement in his declaration: 
"I cautioned Mr. Van Natta that he should not rely on information from outside 
sources purporting to know what was going on inside the OIC. I noted that peo-
ple often overstate their knowledge as wel1 as their own importance. In an effort 
to steer Mr. Van Natta away from an inaccurate report, I suggested that Judge 
Starr was himself a constitutional scholar and would not be swayed by anyone 
person or recent event. I refused to confirm or comment on what Judge Starr or 
the OIC was thinking or doing. I agreed to provide an on-the-record quote, 
which appeared in Mr. Van Natta's article: 'We will not discuss the plans of this 
office or the plans of the grand jury in any way, shape or form.'» 
Id. (underscore added) (quoting Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 'I 8, quoting in tum 
Van Natta, supra note 6, at 1). 
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vice of Professor Kelley; and (5) Mr. Bakaly confirmed that the ole 
was doing research at the National Archives.55 Specifically, the Gov-
ernment asserted that matters (1)-(5) were, in fact, "non-public" and 
that matters (1), (2), and (5) demonstrated that Mr. Bakaly informed 
Mr. Van Natta about what the ole was "thinking and doing."56 
To some extent the resolution of this case depends upon two def-
initional questions: (1) whether the assertion that Mr. Bakaly "refused 
to confirm or comment on what Judge Starr or the ole was thinking 
or doing"57 relates (as the defense would have it) specifically to the 
Ole's internal deliberations regarding a possible indictment,58 or 
whether (as the Government claims) it relates generally to anything 
that was going on in the office;59 and (2) what constitutes "non-pub-
lic" information.60 
It is worth remembering that the Government bears a heavy bur-
den in criminal prosecutions. In light of this burden, the defense has 
the better position on the first question. In the context of the entire 
declaration, the most natural meaning of Mr. Bakaly's statement is 
that he declined to discuss Mr. Starr's or the office's deliberations re-
garding a possible indictment. 
With respect to the second question, concerning the definition of 
"non-public" matters, the defense asserts that the Government did not 
present evidence demonstrating a commonly understood definition 
of that term.61 The defense further notes that it is uncontested that 
none of the matters itemized above were covered by Rule 6(e)'s se-
55. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 'I 64, at 19-23. 
56. See id. (discussing the Government's allegations concerning these five communica-
tions). To prove the charge in Amended Notice 'I 12(b), which alleges that Mr. Bakaly 
falsely stated that he "refused to confirm or comment on what Judge Starr or the ole was 
thinking or doing," Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 'I 8, at 3, the Government also relied 
on a further assertion that Mr. Bakaly did confirm or comment on what was going on in 
the ole when he "discussed 'internal matters' with Mr. Van Natta in an attempt to influ-
ence Van Natta to write an article that would protect the ole and set the stage for its 
future work." Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 'I 65(b), at 23. I do 
not treat this allegation in the text because it rests entirely on one agent's testimony that 
Mr. Bakaly admitted in an interview that "he had discussed internal ole matters with Mr. 
Van Natta." Id. Mr. Bakaly denies that he made this statement. Id. Due to the Govern-
ment's apparent failure to elicit specifics about these matters from the agent at trial, it is 
difficult to evaluate this assertion. 
57. Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 1: 8, at 3. 
58. See Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 50, 'I 63, at 26. 
59. See Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 'I 65, at 23-24. 
60. See Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 50, '1'121-59, at 12-23 (discussing 
the disputed conversations and arguing that Mr. Bakaly did not disclose "non-public" infor-
mation); Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 'I 64, at 19-23 (discussing 
these conversations and characterizing the information disclosed as "non-public"). 
6l. See Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 50, 'I 23, at 13. 
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crecy requirement. 62 Mr. Bakaly' argues that his understanding of 
"non-public" matters was matters covered by Rule 6(e); thus, by defini-
tion, in his mind, nothing he discussed was "non-public."63 
The Government believes that this is an after-the-fact rationaliza-
tion and was not Mr. Bakaly's contemporaneous belief. It argues that 
this position is inconsistent with the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from the chronology of what Mr. Bakaly did and said.64 In cast-
ing about for some standard by which to judge what is "non-public," 
the Government relies on the OIC's concession in the Rule 6(e) litiga-
tion that the information disclosed in the Times article was confiden-
tial and non-public in nature.65 There are at least two difficulties with 
this approach. First, it is questionable whether Mr. Bakaly should be 
bound by counsel's statements in the OIC's filings in the original Or-
der to Show Cause litigation. Second, and more fundamental, only 
two of the above-described communications-the first and the fifth-
even appeared in the Times article.66 Thus, even if the OIC took the 
position that the matters discussed in the article were confidential, 
most of the Government's asserted bases for a finding that Mr. Bakaly 
shared "non-public" information would not be covered by that 
concession. 
Given the Government's burden, it seems to me that if there is 
any arguable basis for a finding that the five items specified above 
were in the public domain, the Government's case should fail. With 
this perspective, were the five pieces of information relied upon by the 
Government "non-public" matters that illuminated in material ways 
the inside workings of the OIC? 
1. Mr. Bakaly Confirmed to Mr. Van Natta the Four options Consid-
ered by the OIC Regarding the Possible Indictment of President Clinton.-This 
is by far the most material of the allegations lodged by the Govern-
ment because the fact that the four options were under consideration 
was apparently that which earned the article its notoriety (even if it 
was questionable whether this was actually "news"). The four options 
available to the OIC were reported to be to decline, to indict and de-
62. See Bakaly's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 18, at 3 ("The motion to show cause based 
on asserted Rule 6(e) violations that was filed by the White House ... -which detailed a 
number of specific portions of the article that contained Rule 6(e) material-did not men-
tion even one of the items contained in any of these five statements."). 
63. See id. at 4. 
64. See Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, , 64(a), at 20. 
65. See id. 'I 64, at 19 (citing Opposition Brief, supra note 20, at 2). 
66. See Van Natta, supra note 6, at 1 (reporting the OIC's four indictment options and 
noting that the office was conducting research at the National Archives). 
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fer trial, to indict under seal, and to await the end of the President's 
term to indict.67 Mr. Bakaly informed OIC counsel that Mr. Van Natta 
had told Mr. Bakaly that he knew about the four options and knew 
that there had been an OIC meeting at which those options were put 
on the blackboard by one of the prosecutors and another OIC attor-
ney.68 The Government seems to accept this statement as true.69 In 
other words, there was a source for this information other than Mr. 
Bakaly. Mr. Bakaly admits that he "'confirmed that these were 
prosecutive options available to the independent counsel.' "70 The 
heart of the dispute between the parties lies in whether Mr. Bakaly did 
more than confirm that these options existed, and, in fact, essentially 
confirmed that they were being actively discussed by the OIC.71 
It is true, as Mr. Bakaly's counsel argues, that conceding that the 
OIC had these four options states a truism to anyone with any familiar-
ity with criminal law.72 I would go further and contend that the fact 
that Mr. Starr was actively considering these options should not have 
been "news" and should not have been considered a "non-public" 
matter. One could reasonably conclude, in fact, that Mr. Starr would 
not be doing his job if he failed to have this debate in light of the facts 
that his mandate was to determine whether a criminal case should be 
pursued based on the conduct discovered, that he had extensively 
used the coercive powers of the criminal law (grand jury, immunity, 
etc.) to investigate the case, and that he had written a report arguing 
67.Id. 
68. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 'I 64(a), at 19. 
69. See id. (arguing that Mr. Bakaly's statement to OIC attorneys is part of the clear 
evidence that Mr. Bakaly confirmed the "four options"). One wonders why we do not yet 
know the identity of the "leaker" who apparently provided the information that Mr. Bakaly 
was asked to confirm. The fact that no one has come forward or been identified (or, 
apparently, sanctioned) lends a certain scapegoat quality to Mr. Bakaly. 
70. Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 50, 'I 31, at 14-15 (quoting Govern-
ment's Exhibit 14, supra note 44, at 4). 
71. It is worth noting that a close reading of the Bakaly Declaration reveals that the 
paragraphs of the Declaration in which the allegedly false statements appeared relate to 
specific conversations between Mr. Bakaly and Mr. Van Natta on specific dates. See generally 
Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16. The defense contends that whatever conversation oc-
curred about the "four options" took place seven days after the conversations described in 
those paragraphs; thus, his statements could not have been false. Bakaly's Proposed Find-
ings of Fact, supra note 50, 'I 28, at 14; id. 'I 65, at 26. Eds.-The district court, in acquit-
ting Mr. Bakaly, also noted the "temporal problem" with the Government's proof on this 
count. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6,29 (D.D.C. 2000). 
72. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Charles G. Bakaly, III's Motion to Dismiss 
Pending Contempt Charges at 15, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 
2000) [hereinafter Bakaly's Reply Brief] ("Such confirmation would convey no more infor-
mation than would, in an ordinary criminal case, a prosecutor's confirmation of a re-
porter's statement that the grand jury will either indict or not indict."). 
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that there was "substantial and credible" evidence that Mr. Clinton 
had committed "high crimes and misdemeanors" potentially warrant-
ing impeachment.73 In any case, it had been publicly reported that 
certain of Mr. Starr's advisors believed that he could indict a sitting 
president and, indeed, that Mr. Starr had been persuaded by Profes-
sor Rotunda that a president could be tried, but not imprisoned, while 
in office.74 Why else would Mr. Starr be considering and deciding this 
question if not to debate the OIC's options vis-a-vis indictment? 
Whatever one concludes about whether confirmation that the 
OIC was actively debating these options was in fact "non-public," it 
seems to me that the Government's proof as to the extent of Mr. 
Bakaly's involvement was fairly limited. According to the defense: 
Mr. Bakaly testified that he did not tell Mr. Van Natta that 
these options had been discussed during an internal OIC 
meeting, did not tell Mr. Van Natta that there was an internal 
OIC meeting at all, did not tell Mr. Van Natta what the ole 
was considering or not considering, and did not tell Mr. Van 
Natta what weight was being given to any of the options. The 
Government offered no contrary evidence.75 
In response, the Government argued that: 
[w]hat occurred in this case is that on January 28, one day 
after the all-attorneys meeting in the OIC, Van Natta specifi-
cally knew that the OIC had recently held a meeting at which 
all four options were listed on a board and discussed. In 
other words, Van Natta knew that all four options were 
under current consideration by the OIC. There can be no 
dispute that that was non-public, internal OIC information. 
In the face of what Van Natta already knew, therefore, Mr. 
Bakaly's confirmation that the four options were "available" 
to Mr. Starr was manifestly a confirmation of the accuracy of 
Van Natta's non-public information about the recent meet-
ing and OIC deliberations. . . . Even if Mr. Bakaly did not 
tell Van Natta about the meeting or the four options in the 
first instance, he helped to give Van Natta a seat at the con-
73. H.R. Doc. No. 105-310, at 1 (1998) ("[TJhe Office of the Independent Counsel ... 
hereby submits substantial and credible information that President William Jefferson Clin-
ton committed acts that may constitute grounds for an impeachment."). 
74. Mr. Baka1y provided numerous examples of such reports. See Bakaly's Proposed 
Findings of Fact, supra note 50, at 16 n.5. 
75. [d. 1 32, at 15 (citation omitted). 
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ference room table on January 27 by confirming the accu-
racy of the information Van Natta had.76 
At bottom, the Government's position seems to be that Mr. 
Bakaly's limited confirmation could have been understood by Mr. Van 
Natta to imply a further confirmation of the fact that there was a meet-
ing at which these issues were discussed. This inference itself seems 
questionable in light of the fact that Mr. Van Natta did not report on 
the January 27 meeting in the article in question 77 (and, had it been 
reported, the fact of such a meeting would have been the only true 
"news" in the article). In any case, it is difficult to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Bakaly lied in denying that he provided 
"non-public" information based not on what he actually said to the 
reporter, but rather on the inferences that a reporter may have taken 
from what was said (but apparently found to be an insufficient basis 
for reporting). This seems precious thin ground upon which to rest a 
criminal contempt case.78 
2. Mr. Bakaly Told Mr. Van Natta That a Perjury Count Based on the 
President's Deposition in the Jones Lawsuit Was a Stronger Case Than the 
Perjury Count Being Tried in the Senate.-Mr. Bakaly does not concede 
that he made this statement, and he questions the accuracy of the 
testifying FBI agent's recollection in this regard.79 Whatever the 
truth, Mr. Bakaly's alleged opinion was widely shared and publicly ex-
pressed by a number of commentators.80 His view would only be 
"non-public" news, then, if it represented a statement of opinion by 
the ole. 
The defense argues that the Government failed to prove that Mr. 
Bakaly told Mr. Van Natta that the views expressed were those of the 
ole. The defense theory is that if the statements were made, they 
were expressions of Mr. Bakaly's personal opinion and did not reveal 
internal ole matters.81 The Government argues that "by virtue of 
76. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 11 64(a), at 20 (citations 
omitted). 
77. See Van Natta, supra note 6, at 1. 
78. Eds.-The district court concluded that "[w]hile the Court finds that Mr. Bakaly 
did confirm and discuss with Mr. Van Natta that these were indeed four options regarding 
indictment of the President that were available to the OIC, the Government has not 
proven that these discussions delved into the OIC's internal, 'non-public' deliberation of 
these options." In reGrandJury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6,28 (D.D.C. 2000). 
79. See Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 50, '1111 38-47, at 17-20. 
80. See id. at 19 n.7 (listing commentators who stated their belief that a peIjury case 
based upon two portions of the President's grand jury testimony would be more difficult to 
prove than peIjury in the Paula Jones case). 
81. See id. n 40-42, at 18. 
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Bakaly's position in the OIC and the context in which the discussions 
were taking place, it is clear that Mr. Bakaly was necessarily providing 
information about the work and thought processes of the OIC."82 
Again, the Government's argument seems to hinge on what Mr. Van 
Natta might have drawn from Mr. Bakaly's statement rather than the 
plain import of the words themselves. And again, given that Mr. Van 
Natta did not actually report that this was the view of the OIC, the 
inference that Mr. Van Natta understood Mr. Bakaly to be speaking as 
Mr. Starr's mouthpiece in this regard is subject to substantial 
question.83 
3. Mr. Bakaly Told Mr. Van Natta That Professor Rntunda Was Not 
in the Office Much and That Mr. Udolf Left the Ole in April or May 1998, 
and May Be Biased Against the OIC.-Mr. Bakaly concedes that he" 're-
minded'" Mr. Van Natta of this information.84 The parties do not 
contest that Mr. Udolf's departure from the office and Professor Ro-
tunda's role as an OIC consultant were public facts. 85 The Govern-
ment contends, however, that: 
Mr. Bakaly's comments on Mr. Rotunda's absence from the 
office and Mr. Udolfs possible biases did convey non-public 
information. Those comments would necessarily have sig-
naled to Van Natta that he should not rely on information 
learned from either Rotunda or Udolf-and indeed, Bakaly 
conceded that is what he intended.86 
"Reminding" Mr. Van Natta of this type of scuttlebutt was hardly a 
disclosure of important "inside" information that revealed the office's 
deliberations regarding indictment. Telling Mr. Van Natta to beware 
of these potentially suspect sources says little about what is going on 
within the OIC-especially since Mr. Van Natta apparently did not 
confirm that these were his sources or communicate the substance of 
82. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 11 64(b), at 2l. 
83. Eds.-The disuict court held that because Mr. Bakaly's opinion regarding the rela-
tive strength of the peIjury charges was not reflected in the Times article, "it could not 
comprise one of the alleged grand jury leaks that movants complained of in their motion 
to show cause," and thus was "immaterial to that motion." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 
117 F. Supp. 2d at 29. The court concluded that "[a]ny discussion of immaterial, 'non-
public' matters cannot properly prove the criminal contempt charge against Mr. Bakaly." 
Id. 
84. Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 50, , 49, at 20 (quoting Govern-
ment's Exhibit 14, supra note 44, at 1-2). 
85. See id. 'I 50, at 21; Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 11 64(c), 
at 22. 
86. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 11 64(c), at 22 (emphasis 
added). 
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their disclosures. Thus, Mr. Bakaly's attempt to raise issues regarding 
their reliability as sources could not even be said to send a signal re-
garding the accuracy of any specific information provided.87 
4. Mr. Bakaly Told Mr. Van Natta That Mr. Starr Relies Quite a Bit 
on the Advice of Professor Kelley.-Mr. Bakaly admits making this com-
ment to Mr. Van Natta.88 The fact that Professor Kelley was a consul-
tant to the OIC, and that he is a friend and former law clerk of Mr. 
Starr's, was public knowledge.89 The Government, however, argued 
that "[b]y telling Van Natta that Judge Starr relies quite a bit on Mr. 
Kelley's advice, Mr. Bakaly may well have permitted Van Natta to draw the 
conclusion, also reported in his article, that Judge Starr agreed with Mr. 
Kelley's view on the indictability of the President."9o 
Again, it is difficult to see how Mr. Bakaly's comment can truly be 
characterized as "non-public" information indicative of the OIC's 
thinking regarding possible indictment. To me, it is self-evident that 
Mr. Starr reached out to employ Professor Kelley, a friend and former 
employee, because he valued Professor Kelley's advice. I view this as 
an obvious makeweight because the "information" leaked seems so ob-
vious-indeed, this is something I (by no means an OIC insider at the 
time) knew or assumed to be true. It would never occur to me that 
this type of information would be considered "non-public," so I have a 
hard time concluding that someone should go to jail for making a 
similar judgment. In any case, the Government's argument again is 
that Mr. Bakaly lied about providing "non-public" information, not 
because he actually provided such information and did not disclose it, 
but rather because a reporter might have drawn inferences regarding 
the goings-on in the OIC from the innocuous comments Mr. Bakaly 
actually made.91 Perhaps this type of argument would support a deci-
87. Eds.-The district court concluded that " [allthough the Court has found that Mr. 
Bakaly made these statements to Mr. Van Natta, it is not apparent how these comments 
disclose material, 'non-public' matters .... They do not prove that Mr. Bakaly's specific 
statement that he declined to discuss non-public matters with Mr. Van Natta is false." In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (citations omitted). 
88. See Baka1y's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 50, U 54-55, at 22. 
89. See id. , 58, at 23; Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, , 64(d), 
at 22 (conceding that these are "publicly known facts"). 
90. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 'J[ 64(d), at 22 (emphasis 
added). 
91. See id. 
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sion to fire Mr. Bakaly; it hardly serves as a legitimate basis to jail 
him.92 
5. Mr. Bakaly Confirmed That the OIC Was Doing Research at the Na-
tional Archives.-Mr. Bakaly early on told representatives of the OIC 
that he had provided Mr. Van Natta with a redacted, internal OIC 
document (referred to as the Bates Memorandum) that contained 
quotations from, and descriptions of debates among, Watergate prose-
cutors regarding the propriety of indicting President Nixon.93 Mr. 
Bakaly also apparently confirmed to Mr. Van Natta that the OIC had 
done research at the National Archives.94 Mr. Van Natta used quoted 
portions of the Bates Memorandum and reported that "Mr. Starr's 
lawyers ... obtained copies of prosecution memorandums in the Na-
tional Archives written by the Watergate prosecutors."95 The Govern-
ment argues that "this information was not public" and that "[t]he 
National Archives research concerns a matter internal to the OIC, re-
flecting the investigative and analytical steps its attorneys were taking 
in the process of evaluating whether to indict the President."96 
This asserted basis for conviction strikes me as even weaker than 
the last. Given that Mr. Bakaly disclosed to the OIC that he had pro-
vided the redacted memorandum that contained some of the Na-
tional Archives research, it is difficult to argue that he intentionally 
sought to withhold the fact that he confirmed the National Archives 
92. Eds.-The district court held that this comment made by Mr. Bakaly provides "a 
very slim basis for a criminal contempt conviction." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. 
Supp. 2d at 29. The court further explained that: 
[i]n order to attach significance to this information, the reporter is required to 
infer that this reliance on Professor Kelley's advice confirms that Independent 
Counsel Starr has concluded that he has the authority to indict a sitting Presi-
dent. Even though the Court concurs with the Government's argument that Mr. 
Bakaly was clearly trying to suggest to the reporter this unspoken piece of sensi-
tive and "non-public" information, the Court is not willing to conclude that Mr. 
Bakaly's inferential message is identical to stating directly that the Independent 
Counsel has concluded that he has the authority to indict the President. While, 
in certain circumstances, a wink and a nod are unquestionably tantamount to 
outright confirmation, the Court is unwilling to base a criminal conviction on Mr. 
Bakaly's un elaborated hint to Mr. Van Natta. 
Ill. at 29-30. 
93. See Bakaly Declaration, supra note 16, 'll 9, at 3. 
94. See Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 'll 64(e), at 22 (citing 
the testimony of FBI Agent Thomas Lewis, who stated that Mr. Bakaly conceded this point 
in a February 25, 1999 interview). Despite the GovernmeIlt's assertion, it should be noted 
that Mr. Bakaly does not make such a concession. See Bakaly's Proposed Findings of Fact, 
supra note 50, at 23 n.13 ("[T]here is no evidence that Mr. Bakaly in fact confirmed [that 
the OIC was doing research at the National Archives]."). 
95. Van Natta, supra note 6, at l. 
96. Government's Proposed Findings of Fact, supra note 43, 'll 64(e), at 23. 
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research. Further, this stretches the outer limits of any definition of 
"non-public" information. If the OIC prosecutors secured library 
cards, would that constitute "inside information"? Perhaps, again, my 
view is affected by the fact that I knew well in advance of the Times 
article that members of the OIC were doing research at the National 
Archives and never considered that this might be confidential, delib-
erative information. My own conclusion was that, given their mandate 
and statutory responsibilities, it was not at all surprising that OIC pros-
ecutors were doing so. I have been told by one member of the media 
that he, too, knew of the research efforts, as presumably did the staff 
at the National Archives and others. 
C. Conclusion 
In sum, I do not condone what Mr. Bakaly was doing in attempt-
ing to "spin" Mr. Van Natta-it is not a function that I believe is ap-
propriate to a prosecutor's office. It also appears that Mr. Bakaly was 
not as forthright as he should have been with either the OIC or the 
court. But it seems to me that the evidentiary basis of this case is very 
thin. The fact that the last two arguments were even put forth by the 
Government underscores just how weak its position is. We can specu-
late as to why the DO] said that it would prosecute the case as a crimi-
nal contempt at the court's election.97 My own supposition is that the 
DO] acted out ofa disinclination to antagonize the Chief]udge of the 
District Court rather than out of any conviction regarding the impor-
tance of the case. It is worth remembering that the DO] declined to 
bring a criminal false statements or perjury prosecution founded on 
the above proof, presumably because the case did not meet DO] stan-
dards. It may have failed the DO] test both because of evidentiary 
difficulties, and because the alleged false statements concerned leaks 
that did not violate Rule 6( e) and indeed concerned leaks all but two of 
which did not even appear in the news article at issue (and one of the two was 
the bogus National Archives charge). In short, this is a case that should 
not or would not have been brought in the normal course. 
II. THE PRESS'S ROLE IN HIGH-PROFILE CRIMINAL CAsES 
The ironies surrounding the Bakaly case abound. First and fore-
most, of course, is the fact that, as of this writing, the only person 
caught up in "Monica-gate" subjected to a criminal trial and under 
immediate and concrete threat of criminal punishment is a member 
of prosecutor Kenneth Starr's office. Not Ms. Lewinsky, who, by her 
97. See Letter from Michael Horowitz, supra note 32, at 2. 
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own immunized account, committed various and sundry federal 
crimesYs Not President Clinton, who many believe to be even more 
culpable than Ms. Lewinsky. No, it is Mr. Starr's "counselor and 
spokesman" who is being prosecuted-at Mr. Starr's referral-by the 
Justice Department, whose ultimate chief is, of course, Mr. Starr's, and 
for a time, Mr. Bakaly's, nemesis. 
Mr. Bakaly is alleged to have lied when he denied discussing a 
number of subjects with Mr. Van Natta, but none of those subjects were 
ones that involved secret grand jury information guarded by Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e).99 The charge of contempt of court 
brought against Mr. Bakaly is founded, then, not on allegedly illegal 
leaking, but rather on the allegations that Mr. Bakaly lied in denying 
that he leaked and obstructed the course of justice in doing so. In 
short, the case supposedly is not about sex-I mean the propriety of 
Mr. Bakaly's otherwise legal leaking-it is about lying about sex-I 
mean leaking. See where I am going here? 
As should be clear from my discussion above, regardless of 
whether the district court concludes that Mr. Bakaly actually lied 
about these matters and finds that the other elements of contempt 
(materiality and interference with the due administration of justice) 
have been proved, it seems to me that this case is a weak one. One 
must ask, then, why it was pursued. What does the case reveal about 
the effect of the press on the quality of criminal justice accorded 
targets (or others) where scandal-driven criminal investigations are at 
issue? And, given the context, what does the case reveal about the 
role or responsibilities of the press in such investigations? 
A. Why Investigatory Targets and Prosecutors Leak and Spin 
Any criminal investigation of high-ranking political officials justi-
fiably rates very high in the media's estimation of newsworthy topics. 
Certainly the appointment of an independent counsel, whether under 
DOJ regulations or under the lapsed independent counsel statute , 100 
confers upon an investigation an instant imprimatur of credibility and 
importance. In these cases, virtually everything-including topics al-
most never discussed in reference to "ordinary" prosecutors, such as 
98. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, HardbaU at the Ritz Puts Starr on the Spot; Critics Question 
Tactics Against Lewinsky, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1998, at Al (reporting that "Starr's aides 
warned [Lewinsky 1 that she could face 27 years in prison on charges of peIjury, obstruc-
tion of justice and witness tampering on the Paula Jones case"). 
99. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
100. The independent counsel statute lapsed on June 30,1999, pursuant to its "sunset" 
provision. 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994). 
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staff hires and office expenditures-seems to find its way into the pub-
lic realm via the press. 1OI What makes the press's role particularly in-
teresting in this context is not, however, its wide range or sheer 
volume-it is the consequence of those qualities. 
The certainty of extensive press attention creates its own dynamic 
that has had a demonstrable effect on the legacy of individual inde-
pendent counsels and the viability of the statute itself. 102 More impor-
tant for present purposes, white-hot media attention may also have a 
profound effect on the conduct and course of a criminal investigation. 
These consequences usually have been said to flow from the interac-
tion between politics and the media-that is, from the simple fact that 
political partisans understand the power of the press to direct public 
attention and shape opinions. In highly politicized cases, such as the 
"scandals" we have just endured, some of those at the center of the 
inquiry, and many at the periphery, are more concerned with the po-
litical consequences of the investigation than its resolution in the 
grand jury or the courts. As I have argued elsewhere: 
Given the public and press attention devoted to [indepen-
dent counsel (IC)] investigations, partisans cannot afford to 
let the IC process simply unfold and the political chips fall 
where they may. Recent experience demonstrates that the 
favored means by which [investigatory targets and their polit-
ical allies seek] to blunt the political damage posed by an IC 
investigation is to attack as biased the IC, or the judges that 
appointed him .... 
. . . Conversely, the opposing political party has every 
incentive to keep the case in the news, to press for a result 
discrediting the person under investigation and the adminis-
tration with which that person is affiliated, and to create 
grave questions about the impartiality or judgment of an IC 
who exonerates the subject. I03 
101. See, e.g., Connie Cass, Starr Reports $4.2 Million in Contract Work; Counsel Defends 
Money Spent far Investigators, Advice, Legal Representation, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1999, at AI0 
(detailing the amount of money spent by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr on private 
investigators and on outside legal and ethical advisors); David A. Vise, Criminal Probe of 
Clinton 'Open'; Counsel Hires Staff, Weighs Indictment, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2000, at Al (re-
porting that Independent Counsel Robert W. Ray hired six lawyers and projected spending 
$3.5 million over six months to continue the OIC's investigation of the Lewinsky scandal). 
102. See Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. 
CRIM. L. REv. 463 passim (1996). 
103. Id. at 464, 474. 
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Politicians have learned to look to the press to air their attacks, 
and the press has cooperated because charges of the politicization of 
the criminal process are indeed highly newsworthy (at least if they 
have some potential to be true). 
What has come into focus during this last investigation is the ex-
tent to which the press attention has affected the conduct of lawyers 
engaged in some capacity in the investigation. As many have noted, 
increasingly: 
attorneys [in high-profile white-collar cases] appear just as 
interested in winning in the court of public opinion as in a 
court of law .... 
. . . "Feeding" the media with information and "spin-
ning" a case so that the facts and circumstances are viewed in 
a light most favorable to one's client has now become a com-
mon practice.104 
Strategic use of the press by the defense is demonstrably on the 
upswing in these cases, and some prominent prosecutors-in the DO] 
as well as in the office of Mr. Starr-believe that the prosecution, too, 
must sometimes speak out in order to safeguard the perceived integ-
rity of investigations subject to defense attack. 105 
To understand the strategy of the game, one must understand 
the constraints imposed on the players by the grand jury process itself. 
White-collar criminal investigations of the type of wrongdoing that is 
often at stake in cases involving highly placed political actors (e.g., 
corruption, false statements, and obstruction) most often are con-
ducted by prosecutors and agents under the authority of a federal 
grand jury. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) imposes upon 
prosecutors, agents, grand jurors, and all others involved in the gov-
ernmental process an obligation to maintain the secrecy of matters 
occurring before the grand jury. 106 The rule does not, however, muz-
zle the witnesses who provide that grand jury with evidence, or those 
104. Eric H. Holder, Jr. & Kevin A. Ohlson, Dealing with the Media in High-Profile White 
Collar Crime Cases: The Prosecutor's Dilemma, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME 1995 at B-1 (ABA 1995); 
see also Moses, supra note 4, passim. 
105. See Holder & Ohlson, supra note 104, at B-1 (stating that prosecutors must at times 
speak to the media to protect their public image and to demonstrate to the public that the 
system of justice is applied equally to all citizens). 
Id. 
106. FED. R CRIM. P. 6(e) (2). The rule states that: 
A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, 
a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or 
any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (3) (A) (ii) of this subdi-
vision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as other-
wise provided for in these rules. 
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with whom the witnesses share their stories, including, of course, wit-
nesses' lawyers.107 Those who are subpoenaed to provide evidence-
either physical or testimonial-may freely detail for the press and 
public just what they have provided to the government, as well as what 
they have learned (through the questions asked or the items re-
quested by subpoena) about the direction or content of the 
investigation. 
A further layer of complexity is provided by the fact that the 
bounds of Rule 6 (e) are not well-defined, 1 08 leaving prosecutors to 
navigate, to some extent, at their own risk when they choose to talk. 
Further, there are a variety of constraints quite apart from Rule 6(e) 
that counsel against prosecutorial discussion of even clearly non-
grand jury investigative materials. 109 The ethical rules that apply in 
most jurisdictions generally bar prosecutors from making extrajudicial 
statements that may negatively influence public proceedings, and, in 
particular, that may compromise the impartiality of decision-mak-
ersYO DOl policy also bars discussion of all but specified types of in-
formation, again, generally in the interests of safeguarding the 
"adjudicatory process," but leaves prosecutors several large "outs."lll 
107. See id. (failing to include such persons within the coverage of the rule and stating 
that "[n]o obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with 
this rule"). 
108. See Richman, supra note 4, at 339-42. 
109. See Moses, supra note 4, at 1816-26. 
110. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct bar lawyers participating in the investiga-
tion into or litigation of a matter from making extrajudicial statements "that a reasonable 
person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer 
knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDU= 
R 3.6(a} (1999); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1994) (stating 
that attorneys should disclose, without elaboration, nothing more than "(I) Information 
contained in a public record. (2) That the investigation is in progress. (3) The general 
scope of the investigation ... [and] (4) A request for assistance in apprehending a 
suspect"). 
111. Both the DO] regulations and the United States Attorneys Manual articulate rather 
strict general standards regarding discussions with the press. See 28 C.F.R § SO.2(b) (2000) 
(limiting information DO] officials can release in a criminal matter to basic facts about the 
defendant-name, age, and other background information-and facts relating to the 
charge or the arrest); 4 DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, tit. 9, § 1-7.S30(A) (2d ed. Aspen Law & 
Bus. 2000-01 Supp.) [hereinafter U.S.A.M.] (barring DO] personnel from "respond[ing] 
to questions about the existence of an ongoing investigation or comment[ing] on its na-
ture or progress, including such things as the issuance or serving of a subpoena, prior to 
the public filing of the document"). But each gives prosecutors the discretion to stray 
from these rules. For example, the United States Attorneys Manual states that: 
[i]n matters that have already received substantial publicity, or about which the 
community needs to be reassured that the appropriate law enforcement agency is 
investigating the incident, or where release of information is necessary to protect 
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If a prosecutor "believes that in the interests of justice and law en-
forcement process"112 non-grand jury information should be made 
public, or where "release of information is necessary to protect the 
public interest, safety, or welfare ,"11 3 she may disclose this investiga-
tory information to the public (after securing relevant approvals). 
Perhaps more important than these rules is the professional cul-
ture that counsels against public discussion of ongoing investigations, 
at least in some prosecutorial circles. That culture is founded not only 
on the above rules, but also on the interests underlying those rules, 
which include law enforcement imperatives, institutional concerns, 
and the professional self-definition of prosecutors as "ministers of jus-
tice." Most obviously, loose lips can sink cases: 
Premature disclosure of investigative data-identity of 
targets, nature of allegations, nature of proof-can lead 
targets to flee, destroy evidence, intimidate or deter wit-
ness[es], create phony evidence, and otherwise impede in-
vestigations. Even disclosures that do not trigger 
obstructionary behavior can impede the government's inves-
tigatory powers by drying up information sources that rely on 
the promise or assumption of confidentialityY4 
Secrecy in the grand jury context is also justified, at least in part, 
to "insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, 
and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from 
importuning the grand jurors." 11 5 Finally, silence is necessary to pro-
tect the privacy of subjects, targets, and witnesses caught up in grand 
jury investigations where the investigation does not lead to an indict-
mentY6 In light of the shattering consequences that disclosure of 
involvement in a criminal investigation may have on an individual's 
the public interest, safety, or welfare, comments about or confirmation of an 
ongoing investigation may need to be made. 
U.SA.M., supra, § 1-7.530(B); see also 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b) (9) (allowing DOl prosecutors, 
subject to the approval of the attorney general or deputy attorney general, to avoid abiding 
by the regulations if that prosecutor "believes that in the interest of the fair administration 
of justice and the law enforcement process information beyond these guidelines should be 
released") . 
112. 28 C.F.R § 50.2(b)(9). 
113. U.SA.M. § 1-7.530(B). 
114. Richman, supra note 4, at 345 (footnote omitted); see also Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol 
Oil Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211,219 n.10 (1979). 
115. Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 219 n.lO (quoting United States v. Proctor & Gamble 
Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958), quoting in tum United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 
628-29 (3d Cir. 1954». 
116. See id. (stating that grand jury secrecy is justified, in part, "to protect the innocent 
accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under 
investigation") . 
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life,I17 prosecutors often conclude that basic fairness dictates that 
publicizing the fact that an investigation is ongoing (let alone the de-
tails of it) is only warranted once a grand jury has passed on the pro-
priety of formal criminal action. At the very least, most prosecutors 
recognize the fundamental illegitimacy of leaking to influence those 
who may be the eventual adjudicators of the defendant's guilt. 1 IS Cer-
tainly prosecutors who leak to score political points or to blacken the 
reputation of an investigatory subject are acting completely beyond 
the professional pale. 
Given the rationales for secrecy in the investigative process, why 
are lawyers for both sides increasingly turning to the court of public 
opinion-and thus the press? From the defense's perspective, 
"[p] erhaps the most important catalyst [for attempting to try cases in 
the press] is that a growing number of lawyers and clients believe a 
public relations strategy can get results in certain kinds of cases. If so, 
the lawyers reason, they have a duty to pursue such a strategy on be-
half of clients."1l9 The kinds of cases in which a public relations strat-
egy makes particular sense are those in which the clients are of a type 
that generate a great deal of media attention, and in which the clients 
are concerned with "the judgment of a number of people and institu-
tions-not just juries."120 Thus, lawyers attempt to use the press to 
117. See Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. Nat'l Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 
864 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that "'[t]here can be no clearer example of an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy than to release to the public that another individual was the 
subject of an FBI investigation'" (quoting Baez v. Dep't of justice, 647 F.2d 1328, 1338 
(D.C. Cir. 1980»). 
118. The DOj regulations explicitly prohibit this type of disclosure: 
At no time shall personnel of the Department of justice furnish any statement or 
information for the purpose of influencing the outcome of a defendant's trial, 
nor shall personnel of the Department furnish any statement or information, 
which could reasonably be expected to be disseminated by means of public com-
munication, if such a statement or information may reasonably be expected to 
influence the outcome of a pending or future trial. 
28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(2) (2000). 
119. Moses, supra note 4, at 1831. Four members of the Supreme Court have recog-
nized that "[a]n attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom door .... [A]n attor-
ney may take reasonable steps to defend a client's reputation and reduce the adverse 
consequences of indictment ... including an attempt to demonstrate in the court of public 
opinion that the client does not deserve to be tried." Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 
1030, 1043 (1991) (opinion of Kennedy, j., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, 
lJ.); see also Holder & Ohlson, supra note 104, at B-1 ("Some casual observers of this process 
may believe that the attorneys involved in such [use of the media in high-profile white-
collar cases] are attempting to improperly influence the jury pool or are simply seeking to 
thrust themselves into the limelight. But more astute observers understand that in high 
profile white collar cases, there are important and legitimate reasons why attorneys cooper-
ate with the media."). 
120. Moses, supra note 4, at 1832. 
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further their clients' interests in minimizing the political or other col-
lateral fallout of an investigation or prosecution, as well as to influ-
ence the outcome of that investigation or prosecution.121 
Defense lawyers are becoming increasingly sophisticated and 
overt in their use of press relations122 and, at least in politicized cases, 
are increasingly relying on an attack strategy. The strategy may be 
stated simply as "putting the government on trial," with the object of 
demonstrating that the investigation or prosecution is meritless or 
trivial and is inspired by political or personal animus. Prosecutors 
usually attribute such a "strategy" at best to zealous representation and 
at worst to cynical manipulation. It is also true that such attack efforts 
are often founded on a sincere (and sometimes accurate) belief that 
the client is being wronged, and that the prosecutor is at best over-
reaching and at worst corrupt. 
The most effective means of attack is obviously to demonstrate 
that the prosecutor is acting illegally, improperly, or, at the very least, 
outside the norms of prosecutorial practice. Such attacks may take a 
variety of forms. One fairly obvious example from recent history is the 
charge that the OIC was overzealous in pursuing a potential criminal 
perjury case based on alleged false statements made in a civil deposi-
tion context. By arguing that such cases are not normally pursued, 
the inference was that the OIC was acting selectively and out of im-
proper purpose. 
Attacks that are founded upon arguments regarding general poli-
cies or practices, however, are less effective than arguments that prose-
cutors have violated clear rules and thus are not only unfair, but also 
lawless. Because there are not that many concrete "rules" that apply 
to prosecutors in the investigative stage, those that apply to the con-
duct of the grand jury provide the best opportunity for the defense to 
demonstrate that a prosecutor is acting beyond the law. For example, 
it is common and effective strategy to charge prosecutors with violat-
ing grand jury secrecy.123 Again, this can be done, as I believe it is in 
121. See id. at 1832-40 (discussing targets of public relations campaigns, including the 
public, judges, prosecutors, executive branch policy makers, and opposing litigants). 
122. See generaUy id. passi11L 
123. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Susan Schmidt, Clinton Vows 'Never'to Resign, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 7, 1998, at Al (quoting President Clinton's attorney David Kendall as stating that 
"[t]he leaking of the past few weeks is intolerably unfair .... These leaks make a mockery 
of the traditional rules of grand jury secrecy. They often appear to be a cynical attempt to 
pressure and manipulate witnesses, deceive the public and smear persons involved in this 
investigation."); Roberto Suro, judge Cites 24 Stories in Ordering Leak Probe, WASH. POST, Oct. 
31, 1998, at A6 (quoting White House special counsel Gregory Craig as stating, "[w]e be-
lieve that the Office of the Independent Counsel has been waging a campaign of leaks 
against the president, in an improper effort to influence public and congressional opinion, 
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most cases, in a sincere effort to force the prosecutor to hew to the law 
and to contain the damage that such disclosures can cause to investi-
gatory targets' reputations, professional or business interests, and so-
cial or family relations, or it can be done for the simple purpose of 
putting the prosecutor at a disadvantage. 
What of prosecutors? Do they simply take their hits and wait for 
vindication at trial? Many do, and properly so. However, in heavily 
politicized cases the answer increasingly seems to be "no." A number 
of legitimate reasons are said to support governmental disclosure of 
(non-grand jury) investigative materials prior to indictment. 124 Pub-
licity may aid the law enforcement effort, for example, by causing wit-
nesses to come forward125 or, as was alleged in the Lewinsky matter, by 
putting pressure on potential cooperators to make a deal quickly.126 
Further, "[m]uch to the interest-and sometimes chagrin-of law en-
forcement authorities, in the course of reporting a story, members of 
the media sometimes uncover additional information that bolsters the 
prosecution's case."127 Discussions with the media about pending 
cases is also said to further the law enforcement mission in a larger 
sense by reassuring the prosecutor's client-the public-that possible 
wrongdoers or crimes are being vigorously pursued, thus building 
confidence in the criminal justice system.128 
and it has done so in direct violation of federal laws safeguarding the confidentiality of 
grand jury proceedings"). 
124. See, e.g., Holder & Ohlson, supra note 104, at B-1 to B-2 (observing that prosecutors 
in high-profile white-collar cases appeal to the media to educate the public about the en-
forcement of the laws, to reassure the public that the law is being applied equally to all 
citizens, and to motivate witnesses to cooperate in ongoing investigations). There are also 
less admirable motives, such as ego gratification, the desire to curry favor with the media, 
the wish to improve the prosecutor's or agent's image for personal career reasons, a plan 
to taint the jury pool, or hopes of harming an investigatory subject. 
125. See id. at B-2 (stating that "publicity frequently causes potential witnesses to come 
forward and share with law enforcement authorities information they have about a particu-
lar case"); Richman, supra note 4, at 346 (explaining that disclosure may compel criminals 
seeking leniency to come forward and may "prod non-culpable people into providing new 
information, by triggering memories, or by merely assuring them that the government is 
pursuing a case"). 
126. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, In a Blizzard of Allegations, Did the Media Throw Caution to the 
Wind?, WASH. PosT,Jan. 27, 1998, at El (noting that "[l]ittle has been reported about the 
motivation of the sources providing the allegations to reporters, although some of the 
leaks are attributed to 'investigators' or 'sources close to the investigation' of independent 
counsel Kenneth W. Starr," and that "[t]his means that journalists, unwittingly or not, may 
be helping prosecutors put pressure on Lewinsky by acting as conduit for selective bits of 
damaging information"). 
127. Holder & Ohlson, supra note 104, at B-2. 
128. See id. at B-1. 
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Finally, and most important for present purposes, some prosecu-
tors believe that "in cases involving well-known people, the public has 
a right to be kept reasonably informed about what steps are being 
taken to pursue allegations of wrongdoing so that they can determine 
whether prosecutors are applying the law equally to all citizens."129 
The political context will often dictate what must be said in order to 
counter attacks of selective and unfair prosecution. Thus, DOJ prose-
cutors may feel compelled to speak to reassure the public that they are 
not sweeping wrongdoing by high-ranking public officials under the 
rug. Independent counsel may wish to talk to the press in order to 
counter allegations that they are engaging in partisan witch-hunts or 
are generating or exaggerating claims of official wrongdoing. 
This last rationale for prosecutorial comment has fans at the 
highest ranks of the Clinton Justice Department as well as in the office 
of Mr. Starr. For example, Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder has 
argued that misperceptions, fed by public officials under investiga-
tion, about the motivations of prosecutors "have a corrosive effect on 
our system of justice, and the only effective means by which prosecu-
tors may dispel them is through the dissemination of timely and accu-
rate information."13o Similarly, Mr. Starr (relying in part on Mr. 
Holder's statements) frequently invoked this justification for his of-
fice's press contacts.131 
129. Id. (emphasis added). 
130. Id. at B-2. It should be noted, however, that although Deputy Attorney General 
Holder's comments have been widely cited as sanctioning prosecutorial comment in such 
circumstances, and his introductory comments unequivocally do so, see ill. at B-1 to B-2, the 
balance of the paper in which these comments appear contains a much more detailed and 
specific discussion, founded on DOJ rules, of the specific types of information that may be 
disclosed and the particular considerations that should apply in making these judgments. 
See id. at B-2 to B-7. In other words, I believe it is a mistake to read Mr. Holder's remarks as 
an invitation for prosecutors to open wide the spigot of information any time defense 
counsel takes a shot at them. Indeed, Mr. Holder's concluding remarks make clear that his 
orientation is ultimately fairness, and not vindication: 
The best policy for any prosecutor to follow when discussing a pending criminal 
matter with reporters is to always be fair and cautious, and to always keep in per-
spective the significance of the case. Although a case or defendant may seem of 
overwhelming importance at the time that the press is howling for information 
and details, eventually every case-no matter how sensational-recedes from the 
headlines as other pressing issues of the day come to the fore. But what lingers 
on in the mind of the public, and what remains permanently affixed in the mem-
ories of one's COlleagues, is how the media inquiries about such cases were han-
dled. If they were consistently handled ethically, fairly, and effectively, then one 
of the greatest responsibilities-and challenges---of a modern day prosecutor will 
have been admirably fulfilled. 
Id. at B-7. 
131. When questioned by David E. Kendall about Mr. Bakaly's appearance on ten talk 
shows and Nightline, Mr. Starr responded: 
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This certainly sounds good-why shouldn't the Government re-
spond to attempts to mislead the public and impair confidence in the 
criminal justice system? There may be a number of reasons. First, this 
rationale has no readily ascertainable standards and obviously can be 
(honestly or not) abused. What constitutes a sufficient attack to war-
rant a prosecutorial response? What limits are there (outside of Rule 
6 (e» on the types of information prosecutors may disclose in re-
sponse to such attacks? When the target of the investigation denies 
wrongdoing and says that the allegations are baseless, may prosecutors 
respond by leaking evidence of guilt? When the defense argues that 
prosecutors are out to get the target, may the Government respond by 
sharing with the press the goods that indicate that the prosecution has 
a factual, and not political, predicate? 
Second, one wonders why, if official credibility is the goal, 
prosecutorial press contacts should ever be off-the-record. Professor 
John Barrett has argued that such contacts should occur only at the 
highest levels, should be made generally and not to individual report-
ers, and should "always, and only, [be] on the record."132 A policy 
that "[a]nonymity should end and accountability should begin"133 
would have the virtue of "demonstrat[ing] law enforcement's substan-
tive commitment to fair play and restraint in using the powerful voice 
of government."134 It would also force prosecutors to be conservative 
in employing this rationale for making public statements. Finally, it 
would "permit law enforcement officials to be held accountable both 
for their statements and for the substantive acts that on-the-record 
statements can explain, thereby eliminating the 'who said what' mys-
teries that stem from the media protecting their sources and too often 
are the end of today's leaks investigations."135 
Most fundamentally, one could argue that prosecutors, if they are 
wise, will never enter the fray; if they do, experience demonstrates 
Not only do we have the right, we have the duty to engage in a proper public 
information function because this is the public's business. We must do so in or-
der at times to combat misinformation that is being spread about, including fre-
quently by lawyers who claim that their clients have been grossly mistreated, 
which is what criminal defense lawyers are paid to do. 
Starr Is Questioned by Abbe D. LoweU andDavidE. Kendal~ WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1998, atA36; 
see also Editorial, An Unruly Mess, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1998, at A16 (quoting Mr. Starr's 
explanation for subpoenaing presidential aide Sidney Blumenthal to be that" 'misinforma-
tion'" spread about prosecutors may be "'intended to intimidate prosecutors and investiga-
tors, impede the work of the grand jury, or otherwise obstruct justice'"). 
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that they will be drawn into a long and damaging seige that they prob-
ably cannot win. Prosecutors and defense counsel are not on a level 
playing field in this game. Prosecutors are hampered in their re-
sponses to defense attacks not only by the constraints discussed above, 
but also by the widespread public belief that prosecutors must hew to 
a higher standard. To the extent that prosecutors are perceived to be 
engaging in a public relations battle with the targets of what is sup-
posed to be a dispassionate search for truth and justice, they have lost 
the war in public perception. Further, if a prosecutor begins with, 
and is consistent in implementing, no matter the temptation, a policy 
that he will not comment on the investigation, he will be much less 
vulnerable when accusations of leaking fly. Once prosecutorial 
tongues start wagging, however, it is difficult to draw, let alone police, 
the appropriate lines of commentary. No one-least of all the press, 
to whom prosecutors have been chatting-will necessarily credit deni-
als of improper leaks. In sum, it appears that the more prosecutors 
talk, the more likely they are to feed the credibility war rather than 
dampen it. 
Whatever the scope, form, or wisdom of appropriate prose-
cutorial commentary, it is important to note that the justification as-
serted by Mr. Starr rests on the reactive quality of such commentary: 
discussions with the press are only warranted to clean up damage 
caused by unfair or misleading charges by those under investigation. 
Many of the attacks in this case were overt-Mr. Starr and the Presi-
dent's counsel engaged in highly public, lengthy, recurring, and very 
bitter skirmishing over the source of leaks.136 Some caught up in this 
war claim that the defense also employed a more subtle tactic-what I 
refer to as the "reverse-spin-Ieak." The defense in this scenario desires 
not only to leak information to the press in a way that lessens its nega-
tive impact while remaining anonymous, but also to get the story out 
in a way that leaves the impression that it was leaked by prosecutors. 
Thus, the leaker may score points by presenting to the press, in a 
more sympathetic light or at a more advantageous time, damaging 
facts that the leaker anticipates will become public in any case.137 Fur-
136. See, e.g., Susan Schmidt, Clintons' LaWYfff Alleges Ethics Breach by Starr; Article Cited; 
Whitewater Investigator Says No Secrecy Rules Wm Violated, WASH. POST, June 4, 1997, at A7 
(discussing David Kendall's accusation that Mr. Starr is running a "leak-and-smear" cam-
paign against the Clintons and Mr. Starr's response); Kendall: 'A Deluge of Illegal Leaks,' 
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1998, at A13 (reprinting a letter from David Kendall, President Clin-
ton's personal attorney, to Kenneth Starr, accusing the OIC of leaking inaccurate grand 
jury information, and Mr. Starr's response). 
137. That this type of leaking occurs seems uncontested. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Some-
one's Always Spilling Something in Washington, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1998, at Dl (stating that 
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ther, the leaker aims to rack up additional points by accusing the pros-
ecutors of Inappropriate or illegal leaking. That the facts leaked were 
damaging (though not as harmful as they would have been if they had 
come to light under different circumstances or at another time) en-
hances the credibility of the charge that the facts must have come 
from prosecutors. 
This strategy obviously depends upon the leaker's ability to main-
tain her anonymity. It thus depends upon the reporter's willingness 
to run the story without specific attribution. More fundamentally, it 
counts (with substantial justification in recent experience) upon the 
media's refusal to disclose the identity of confidential sources and 
others' inability or unwillingness to root out or force such a 
disclosure. 
The "reporter's privilege" to refuse to disclose confidential 
sources is, at best, a qualified one in the context of a criminal investi-
gation.138 However, as a matter of reporters' ethics, "[o]nce [they] 
have taken information off the record, they are obligated-by per-
sonal honor, traditions of their craft, and a pragmatic desire to pre-
serve reputations of trustworthiness, but certainly not by law-never 
"White House aides, meanwhile, are so practiced in this realm [of leaking] that they have 
leaked damaging information about their boss as a way of putting it behind them, some-
times doing the deed on a busy news day or a Friday night to minimize the publicity"). 
Certainly prosecutors thought that this was happening: 
Starr asserted that defense lawyers have their own motives to secretly disclose in-
formation. "The 'leaks' that you complain about, thus, may have come from 
sources close to those under investigation," Starr said. "Those sources would have 
a clear and manifest motivation to release harmful information with carefully 
crafted defenses in order to lessen the painful impact of such evidence when it is 
revealed through official proceedings." 
Baker & Schmidt, supra note 123, at AI. 
138. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,667 (1972) (plurality opinion) (holding that 
requiring reporters to appear before a federal grand jury does not abridge First Amend-
ment rights). The Branzhurg Court explained: 
[W]e perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement 
and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the 
consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result from 
insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to 
them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial. 
Id. at 690-91. Subsequent cases affirmed the principles set forth in Branzhurg. See Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (citing Branzhurg and stating that "the First 
Amendment [does not] relieve a newspaper reporter of the obligation shared by all citi-
zens to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant to a criminal 
investigation, even though the reporter might be required to reveal a confidential 
source"); Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201 (1990) (stating that "[i]n Branzhurg, 
the Court rejected the notion that under the First Amendment a reporter could not be 
required to appear or to testify as to information obtained in confidence without a special 
showing that the reporter's testimony was necessary"). 
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to reveal the identity of the source."139 "Leak investigators know this 
and, if they also understand the value of free and aggressive reporting 
in a constitutional democracy, they tend not even to ask reporters, 
much less seek to enforce subpoenas that might compel them to de-
scribe who told them what and when."140 As a consequence of these 
and other factors, leak investigations are notoriously unsuccessful in 
definitively isolating the source of leaks-or in clearing innocent par-
ties accused of leaking. 141 Finally, despite isolated calls to arms,142 re-
porters apparently have been disinclined to throw themselves into 
investigations of their fellow journalists' sources-even where the 
source of press leaks is major news.143 
Was this reverse-spin-Ieak strategy actually employed by President 
Clinton's defense team? Maybe some persons aligned with the admin-
istration undertook this approach, but I personally do not believe that 
the President's legal team did so. One could as easily accuse the pros-
ecution of a nefarious "reverse-reverse-spin-Ieak" attack, under which 
prosecutors falsely accuse the defense of employing a reverse-spin-Ieak 
strategy in order to make the defense look like cynical manipulators 
of public opinion (and guilty as hell). I also do not believe that this 
was the case. But the point is that we will never know just how far the 
spin game spun out of control because the guardian of the secret is 
139. BRUCE M. SWAIN, REpORTERS' ETHICS 52 (1978). 
140. Barrett, supra note 4, at 624 (footnote omitted). 
141. See id. at 623; Richman, supra note 4, at 341 (explaining that "in the absence of a 
confession by a law enforcement source (or, even less likely, a reporter with no interest in 
being a future beneficiary of leaked information) leaks are virtually impossible to prove" 
(footnote omitted)}. 
142. For example, an editorial in the Washington Post questioned the absence of report-
ing on the sources of leaks and stated that: 
there would seem to be a very good reason for reporters to try to learn the source 
of their competitors' leaks. Mter all, we are investigating a possible political and 
legal scandal here, and the leaks-forbidden both by statute and by judicial pro-
hibition-are an integral aspect of that illegality. Why should journalists conspire 
to cover up such crimes? 
William Raspberry, Editorial, Neglected Story: Who's Leaking?, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1998, at 
A25. 
143. For example, the Washington Post reported: 
[T]here was a bizarre quality to the weekend coverage of White House charges 
that independent counsel Kenneth Starr was illegally leaking in the Monica 
Lewinsky case. At least some journalists at each major news organization know 
whether Starr's staff is in fact dishing on background, but the stories are written 
as though this were an impenetrable mystery. 
Howard Kurtz, With Leaks, Reporters Go with the Flow, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1998, at Bl; see also 
Howard Kurtz, The Media's Starr Tum; Independent Counsel Draws Increased Scrutiny, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 4, 1998, at Dl (discussing allegations that Starr "received relatively gentle treat-
ment [by the press] until now ... [because] reporters depend on his office for crucial 
leaks"). 
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the press, and the press is not telling. This press silence had a central 
role in the escalation of the bitter battle for public relations advan-
tage. In other words, the lack of real-time information about who was 
leaking to the press fueled the perceived need to meet leak with leak, 
spin with spin. Because of each side's apparent conviction that the 
other was employing unattributed leaking (and perhaps reverse-spin 
and reverse-reverse-spin leaking) to strategic effect,144 the dynamic 
was considerably magnified to the point where it became a very impor-
tant and consuming story in its own right. 
B. The Role of the Press in Responding to Parties' Leaking and Spinning 
Which brings us, at last, to the subject of this Article: What does 
this state of affairs imply for journalists' practice of their craft? There 
are a number of levels that may warrant examination-proceeding 
from the very general to the specific case of Mr. Bakaly. 
1. Consideration of the General Systemic Consequences of Leaks on the 
Administration of Justice.-Reporters obviously seek to report that 
which is news; they are most interested, then, in obtaining and pub-
lishing the very nonpublic information that traditional prosecutorial 
practice-as well as, in some circumstances, federal law-proscribes 
law enforcement sources from sharing. When seeking to elicit such 
information, one may first ask whether reporters should consider the 
generalized public policy reasons for maintaining the secrecy of this 
information prior to publishing it. 
Some, but apparently not all, journalists may be concerned about 
the consequences of their reporting.145 It seems, however, that the 
default position of the media generally, and most reporters in particu-
lar, is that news-gathering and dissemination in the grand jury context 
is in the public interest-virtually without limit. The criminal justice 
system's emphatic protection of investigatory information notwith-
144. See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 4, at 882-83 (the author, a consultant employed by the 
OIC, discussing strategic leaking by the defense); Baker & Schmidt, supra note 123, at Al 
(reporting that in response to defense charges that" 'someone else is leaking unlawfully 
out of the grand jury proceeding,'" Mr. Starr "fired back with his own statement last night, 
saying leaked information about the investigation could have come from numerous pea-
pie-including Clinton's own attorneys-and accusing the president's camp of trumping 
up complaints about leaks as part of 'an orchestrated plan to deflect and distract this 
investigation'") . 
145. See, e.g., SWAIN, supra note 139, at 54-59. To be clear, the above discussion focuses 
on considerations implicated in reporting on investigative information, and particularly 
grand jury functioning. I do not mean to suggest that the media never considers public 
policy concerns-such as national security concerns-when making decisions regarding 
whether to publish particular pieces of news. 
HeinOnline -- 60 Md. L. Rev. 183 2001
2001] THE PRESS AND HIGH-PROFILE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 183 
standing, many reporters seem to believe that in the overwhelming 
majority of cases, there is no cognizable individual interest and no real 
societal cost to publication of such information-or at least no inter-
est or cost that reporters should be required to consider. 
The Supreme Court has determined that in most circumstances 
where there is a real conflict between the criminal justice system's 
need to obtain evidence from the press and the press's interest in 
maintaining the confidentiality of its sources, any First Amendment 
interests implicated must take a back seat to those of the criminal pro-
cess.146 The Court, however, might strike a different balance when 
the conflict is between the criminal system's interest in keeping infor-
mation from the press and the press's responsibilities in informing the 
public. Indeed, one could argue that the law has implicitly resolved 
this tension. In general, the rules against provision of investigatory 
details to the press are far from airtight, and even Rule 6(e) does not 
purport to impose an obligation of secrecy on those not expressly 
bound by the rule who receive improperly shared information. 147 First 
Amendment interests, then, generally trump law enforcement inter-
ests in this context, and perhaps rightly so. Asking reporters to forego 
a story in light of public policy considerations at this level of abstrac-
tion invites too great a compromise of their essential function. 
In any case, whatever the legal or policy resolution of this tension, 
it is exceedingly unrealistic to expect the press to decide in high-pro-
file cases that the generalized reasons why investigatory secrecy may be 
important to the functioning of the system as a whole are sufficient to 
kill a story that otherwise seems newsworthy. Thus, although I throw 
this suggested topic out in the interest of completeness, consideration 
of the general public policy concerns implicated by disclosure of sensi-
tive investigative data-even grand jury material-is not a topic over 
146. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972) (plurality opinion); supra note 
138. 
147. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (stating that "[n]o obligation of secrecy may be imposed 
on any person except in accordance with this rule"); see also United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 
670,675 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[b]y its own terms, ... 'Rule 6(e) applies ... only to 
individuals who are privy to the information contained in a sealed document by virtue of 
their positions in the criminal justice system'" (quoting Worrell Newspapers of Ind., Inc. v. 
Westhafer, 739 F.2d 1219, 1223 (7th Cir. 1984»); Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. Nat'l 
Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856,870 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that "Rule 6(e)'s 
prohibition on disclosure applies only to individuals who have had access to that informa-
tion by virtue of their relationship to the grand jury investigation or under another provi-
sion of the rule"); In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 181 F.R.D. 680, 693 (N.D. Ga. 
1998) (noting that none of the cases cited by the parties "holds that a private party-
whether a newspaper reporter, an attorney, or a disinterested citizen-is obliged under the 
literal terms of Rule 6(e)(2) to refrain from releasing information when that party, 
through no affirmative act of his own, comes into possession of grand jury materials"). 
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which reporters would spend much time struggling and thus is not 
one upon which I will dwell further. 
2. Consideration of the Results of the Leak-and-Spin Dynamic Wit-
nessed in High-Profile Cases.-The second layer of inquiry deals more 
specifically with the particular dynamic discussed in Part II.A above, 
which raises at least two challenges for journalists that may be worthy 
of more prolonged discussion. The first challenge concerns how the 
parties' efforts to use the press to achieve strategic advantage in high-
profile (particularly politically sensitive) cases affects journalists' pur-
suit of their basic task-to seek the facts and credibly report them. The 
question is how this unattributable leaking and spinning affects both 
reporters' ability to accurately report matters of vital public interest 
and the trust invested in reporters by their readers. The second chal-
lenge concerns how journalists should, in slogging through the swamp 
of spin, behave when they have become, in essence, the heart of the 
story. What responsibilities do reporters and news organizations have 
to their public when they, as receivers and purveyors of leaks, become 
central to a dynamic that has important ramifications for the fair and 
effective administration of criminal justice-both in systemic terms 
and in individual cases? 
Journalists might acknowledge the above-described dynamic and 
respond, "so what?" They would no doubt assert that despite the 
machinations of politicians, lawyers, or investigatory targets, the 
press's fundamental obligation remains constant-to report the news. 
The coverage of the Lewinsky grand jury investigation may have set 
new (and I hope final) records for the extent to which reporters re-
lied upon unnamed sources.148 Decisions to report news that con-
148. See, e.g., Kurtz, supra note 137, at D1 (discussing the proliferation of leaks that has 
coincided with the Lewinsky scandal, stating that "the sheer velocity of the Lewinsky saga 
makes it hard to follow the anonymous action without a scorecard"). Washington Post re-
porter Howard Kurtz again touched on this phenomenon, reporting that: 
[w]hat's remarkable, for a secret grand jury investigation, is how quickly reporters 
are obtaining sensitive information about Lewinsky's discussions with 
prosecutors .... 
. . . But everyone seems to be talking without names attached. The Washing-
ton Post yesterday cited "sources close to the Lewinsky team" (along with "a lawyer 
familiar with her account") in reporting that the former White House intern had 
spilled the alleged beans about a sexual relationship with Clinton and their dis-
cussions about keeping it secret. USA Today ("two people with knowledge of the 
deal"), the New York Times ("two lawyers familiar with her account"), the Washing-
ton Times ("lawyers close to the probe") and other news organizations reported 
similar details. 
Howard Kurtz, Eager Media Revel in Another Starr Tum, WASH. POST, July 30, 1998, at B1. 
Earlier that year, Post reporter Howard Kurtz had reported: 
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cerns not only the substance of an unresolved criminal investigation, 
but also details of the most intimate sort, based on unnamed sources, 
have been justified on the ground that it was the only way to get the 
story. Members of the media, relying on such precedents as Water-
gate, contend with justification that the fact that this information is 
being leaked by persons who will not go on record cannot bar report-
ers from pursuing the facts and reporting them. I49 Responsible re-
porters, the argument goes, recognize their sources' not-so-hidden 
agendas and respond accordingly.I50 A good journalist will play the 
spinning sides off of each other, talk to a variety of sources, corrobo-
rate the facts leaked, and record the result. I51 This is what reporters 
would say they always do-regardless of the subject-matter under 
consideration. 
Further, one could argue that as long as the information is accu-
rate the press should not care whose ox is being gored by its release. 
If the defense is leaking for damage control or for more nefarious 
purposes, it is of little moment as long as the story is true. Similarly, 
The furious pace of the coverage of alleged sexual misconduct in the White 
House has all but shattered traditional media standards and opened the flood-
gates to a torrent of thinly sourced allegations and unrestrained speculation .... 
That is the view of some media critics, academics and journalists, such as 
James Fallows, editor of U.S. News & World Report, who argued that much of the 
reporting has "gotten out of control." 
Kurtz, supra note 126, at E1. 
149. See, e.g., Kurtz, supra note 143, at B1. Post reporter Howard Kurtz noted: 
Those who defend leaks (which is to say, most journalists) point to their value in 
ferreting out malfeasance: the Pentagon Papers, Watergate, and so on. Unless 
reporters are free to vacuum up leads from whistle-blowers, disgruntled officials, 
police sources and so on, much important information would never become 
public. 
Id.; see also Robert G. Kaiser, A Word to Post Readers; More About Our Sources and Methods, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1998, at Cl (acknowledging that readers and many journalists are 
"infuriated by anonymous sourcing," but stating that "we also think our readers should 
know that sometimes granting anonymity to sources is the only way to acquire publishable 
information on matters of interest and importance to them. So, if we have confidence in 
our information, we will print it."). 
150. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, The Sources of the Leaks; Anonymous Tipsters Duel It Out in the 
Newspapers, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1998, at B6 (quoting Michael Oreskes, the New York Times' 
Washington bureau chief as stating that "whenever you use unidentified sources, there is 
an even higher threshold than when you name your sources to be certain you've checked 
the information and you're certain you're not being used, and we do it"). 
151. See, e.g., id. (quoting Michael Oreskes as stating, when asked about differences 
between the Times' account and the Post's account of the same story, "We called the White 
House early in the day and gave them plenty of time to react and we published every word 
of that reaction."); Kurtz, supra note 143, at Bl (stating that "[m]ost prosecutors don't 
simply call reporters and hand them neatly packaged evidence. In the real world, journal-
ists collect bits and pieces and then seek guidance or confirmation from those running an 
investigation.") . 
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whether prosecutors choose to share nonpublic facts to counter misin-
formation or to taint the jury pool, what matters is that the public gets 
the information it needs. Indeed, once the credibility of the informa-
tion is established, the only reason that the leaker's motivation is rele-
vant is if it turns out to be independently newsworthy-for example, 
where (as the opposing camp inevitably charges) the leak is designed 
to mislead the public or undermine its confidence in the good faith of 
the Government's or defense's efforts. 
Finally, one could point to the degree to which the stories that 
relied on unnamed sources proved accurate to justify reporters' deci-
sions to report what and as they did.152 Does the fact that much (al-
though by no means all) of the information reported proved true-
the existence of a semen-stained dress, the cigar story, the phone 
sex-demonstrate that no further soul-searching is in order?153 Does 
this establish that the press did its job and need have no further con-
cern about its role in the scandal or the effect of its choices on the 
administration of criminal justice? 
I think these are substantial questions because the ultimate accu-
racy of the facts derived from unnamed sources is not the only consid-
eration here. Given the public controversy surrounding how those 
facts were obtained, and the potential consequences of that contro-
versy, the sourcing of the stories had an importance separate from the 
facts reported. 
There are two principal reasons why a continuing discussion of 
reporters' sourcing decisions in the Lewinsky scandal is worthwhile. 
First, being vindicated in hindsight is all well and good, but many re-
porters may have done lasting damage to their credibility by relying so 
extensively on unnamed sources while the investigation was ongoing. 
To put it bluntly: readers noticed and were perturbed.154 Judging 
from what I read, many members of the public (and some members of 
152. See Howard Kurtz, Reporters, Questioning Themselves, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1998, at C1 
(stating that "[slomejournalists view the impeachment vote as some sort of validation" and 
quoting Newsweek's managing editor, Ann McDaniel, as stating "[wlhereas we've been criti-
cized for coverage of the facts, virtually all of that proved to be true."). 
153. For a critique of the press's performance in the scandal, see Steven Brill, Pressgate, 
in BRILL'S CONTENT, Parts 1-6 Ouly/ Aug. 1998). For objections to Mr. Brill's analysis, see, 
for example, Letters from Susan Schmidt, Reporter, the Washington Post, and Kenneth W. 
Starr, Independent Counsel, to Steven Brill, Editor, Brill's Content, reprinted in BRILL'S 
CONTENT Ouly/Aug. 1998). 
154. See, e.g., Kaiser, supra note 149, at Cl (acknowledging that "many readers are infuri-
ated by anonymous sourcing"); Geneva Overholser, Editorial, How About Some Restraint?, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1998, at C6 (discussing readers' concerns and noting that "[tlhe 
Lewinsky story calls for particular care first because of the sourcing-thin at the onset and, 
as the sources grew more numerous, very problematic"). 
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the press) 155 thought, at the time, that this was shoddy journalism, 
and after-the-fact vindication may not completely erase the taint. The 
Washington Post responded to its readership's complaints about the 
overuse of anonymous sources in reporting on the Lewinsky investiga-
tion by saying, basically: "We are pros. Trust US."156 The Post asserted 
that "[w]e know we will be accountable for our accuracy. We hope 
that readers will judge The Post by its reliability. Nothing is more im-
portant to us than our credibility."157 But are the Post and the press in 
general truly accountable in these circumstances? 
Because of the exceptional circumstances of this case-the publi-
cation of the grand jury transcripts, the disclosure of the Starr refer-
ral, and the congressional impeachment proceedings-the public was 
able to evaluate the press's accuracy in recounting the facts leaked. 
What is worth remembering, however, is that these media practices 
were ongoing long before it became clear that a full account would be 
forthcoming. Real-time accountability, then, was not a foregone con-
clusion. If we are concerned here with the lessons of this scandal and 
its legacy, one may wonder whether we will be so "lucky" in the future 
and whether reporters should reconsider their practices in the face of 
a future in which such accountability may not be so promptly or ex-
tensively available-and thus the damage done to public trust may be 
more lasting. 
Further, the "accountability" made possible by the public record 
is confined to the facts, not the sourcing, in these articles. And those 
who followed the press coverage closely have reason to question 
whether some of the attributions used were entirely accurate or pro-
vided readers with a fair basis for evaluating the information provided. 
For example, at least one associate of the OIC has suggested that re-
porters used attributions that tended to imply that the facts came 
155. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Sleazy Pickings: Vindication, of a Sort, for Journalists, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 14, 1998, at B1. Howard Kurtz, a writer for the Washington Post, shared a senti-
ment similar to that of readers: 
[d. 
If you listen carefully, you can hear the sound of journalists slapping themselves 
on the back. Mter all, 99.5 percent of what they reported about President Clin-
ton and Monica Lewinsky was right there in Ken Starr's report. Vindication 
city! ... 
Well, not so fast. True, the media bloodhounds deserve credit for staying on 
the trail while White House aides scolded them for being out of control. But a 
flimsy, thinly sourced story is still shoddy journalism-even if the reporter lucks 
out and the charge turns out to be accurate. Good reporting is about nailing 
down facts, not publishing secondhand suspicions. 
156. See, e.g., Kaiser, supra note 149, at Cl (responding to reader criticism of the Post's 
extensive use of unidentified sources). 
157. [d. 
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from anonymous sources within or associated with the OIC when they 
actually came from persons unaffiliated with that office. 158 Certainly 
the Times article at the heart of the Bakaly case-one of the few in-
stances in which readers had the opportunity to examine sourcing de-
cisions-creates serious issues regarding the potentially misleading 
nature of unnamed attributions. 
Mr. Bakaly concedes that he faxed to Mr. Van Natta a redacted, 
internal OIC memorandum often referred to as the "Bates Memoran-
dum."159 The Bates Memorandum consisted of quotations from, and 
descriptions of, debates (all derived from public sources) among the 
Watergate prosecutors as to whether and when to indict President 
Nixon. l60 Mr. Van Natta attributed at least three of these quotations 
to "associates of Mr. Starr,"161 making it appear that the quotations 
described an ongoing discussion within the OIC, rather than a debate 
that happened long before in the Watergate prosecutors' office.162 
Perhaps I am alone in this, but such an attribution strikes me as obvi-
ously incorrect. Perhaps Mr. Van Natta had a knowledgeable source 
associated with the OIC who confirmed that such statements were be-
ing echoed (verbatim) in debates then being held in Mr. Starr's office; 
unfortunately, we are unlikely to ever know whether such a source 
existed. 
The same Times piece points up another problem, which (I am 
told) arises with some frequency when reporters accept off-the-record 
information, particularly from institutional sources. The Times article 
stated that Mr. Bakaly "declined to discuss the matter" and then 
158. See Rotunda, supra note 4, at 875-77,882-87 (discussing examples ofleaks attributed 
to sources within or associated with the OIC that actually came from other sources). 
159. Bakaly's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 18, at 7-8. 
160. Id. 
161. Van Natta, supra note 6, at 1. 
162. See Bakaly's Pre-Trial Brief, supra note 18, at 8. The historical excerpts (under-
scored) were contained in the following excerpts from the Times piece: 
(1) Those in favor [of indicting a sitting President] have cited a view held by some 
prosecutors in Mr. Jaworski's office that "a failure to indict the incumbent Presi-
dent, in the face of evidence of his criminal activity, would seriously impair the 
integrity of the criminal process," an associate of Mr. Starr said.; 
(2) Another argument in favor is that "prosecutors should pay no heed to consid-
erations of national interest," an associate of Mr. Starr said. As a prosecutor in 
Mr. Jaworski's office said in 1974: "We have a duty to act without regard for exter-
nal factors. It is not for us to weigh the political effects."; 
(3) But several of Mr. Starr's prosecutors have also said that the Nixon-era prose-
cutors considered both the risk that the Supreme Court would ultimately strike 
down an indictment and the impact on the nation. 
Van Natta, supra note 6, at 1 (underscore added); see also Bakaly's Pre-Trial Brief, 
supra note 18, at 9 (citing the above mentioned passages and noting those portions taken 
from the Bates Memorandum). 
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quoted Mr. Bakaly as stating that "[w]e will not discuss the plans of 
this office or the plans of the grand jury in any way, shape or form."163 
This seems to the uninitiated (me) as inaccurate-regardless of 
whether one adopts the Government's view of the Bakaly case or Mr. 
Bakaly's own position-because Mr. Bakaly did in fact "discuss the 
matter" extensively with Mr. Van Natta. 
I understand that reporters covering institutions may confront a 
dilemma when their institutional sources give them on-the-record re-
sponses of "no comment" while providing them newsworthy material 
off-the-record or on background. Reporters in such a situation may 
feel obliged to report the official "no comment," and will further use 
the other information and attribute it to anonymous "sources." 
Viewed from the perspective of the reader, this is misleading; the story 
implies that the anonymous "source" is separate and apart from the 
institutional actor purportedly refusing comment. However, the com-
mitment to letting both sides be heard while providing all relevant 
information puts reporters in a real bind. They may feel that they 
cannot, in a straightforward way, provide the necessary news and perti-
nent sourcing without compromising the anonymity promised the 
source (and their relationship with that source). 
Whatever one's resolution of this dilemma in the normal case, 
the Times piece exacerbated the problem by both including quotes (at-
tributed to an "associate" of Mr. Starr) from the very source who pur-
portedly "declined to comment" and then quoting that source to state, 
"[ w] e will not discuss the plans of this office or the plans of the grand 
jury in any way, shape or form."164 Although, if you accept Mr. 
Bakaly's version of his interaction with Mr. Van Natta, the latter state-
ment is probably literally true, it strikes me as even more misleading 
than the "declined to discuss the matter" given the context. Its em-
phatic tone and wide-ranging scope implies that the office had im-
posed a complete blackout on information relating to the article, 
when in fact Mr. Bakaly had spoken to Mr. Van Natta at length about 
the piece and had, at the least, provided him the memorandum from 
which Mr. Van Natta drew quotations that he attributed to the office. 
The opportunity to examine the sourcing decisions in the Times 
piece is unusual. Although it is also hardly reassuring, I am willing to 
accept that sourcing decisions are generally more straightforward. 
The point is, however, that questions about the accuracy of descrip-
tions of anonymous sources have been raised, and readers will never 
163. Van Natta, supra note 6, at l. 
164. Id. 
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know whether such attributions were fair. The brutal pressures of the 
twenty-four-hour news cycle and the superheated competition to re-
port on the unfolding mega-story may explain some mistakes or mis-
judgments. It may also be, however, that some misleading sourcing 
flowed from conscious decisions made to enhance the credibility of 
reports, to shield sources or reporters, to curry favor with important 
sources of infonnation, or to achieve other ends. Certainly the reader 
is not generally privy to how individual reporters or news organiza-
tions resolve the dilemma discussed above with respect to the simulta-
neous provision of infonnation and on-the-record refusals to 
comment. What we do know is that the suggestion that the characteri-
zation or treatment of the leaking sources may not have been entirely 
honest or straightforward creates large credibility issues for the press. 
Another credibility issue is raised when the recipient of the 
leaked infonnation subsequently reports on responses to the leak-
particularly where a reporter documents accusations as to the sources 
of leaks when she knows those accusations to be untrue. A recent 
controversy illustrates the point. On the day that Vice President AI 
Gore was scheduled to speak to the Democratic National Convention, 
Pete Yost of the Associated Press reported that, according to "legal 
sources ... who are outside [Independent Counsel Robert] Ray's of-
fice," Mr. Ray had empaneled a new grand jury to hear evidence 
against President Clinton in the Monica Lewinsky scandal. 165 Mr. Yost 
later reported on the outraged reactions of Democrats who believed 
that Republicans intent on hurting Vice President Gore were the 
source of the leak.166 Shortly thereafter, Judge Richard Cudahy ad-
mitted that he had inadvertently divulged the grand jury secret to a 
reporter (presumably Mr. Yost) during a press inquiry (although what 
prompted the inquiry is still subject to examination) .167 Did Mr. Yost, 
as one member of the press has charged/68 act unethically? Mr. Yost 
"kept a poker face, reported the facts, and protected his sources"169-
all to the good. Mr. Yost also made clear that his sources were not 
within Mr. Ray's office, so readers were in a position to judge for 
themselves charges that the leaks came from Mr. Ray. But what about 
charges that the leaks came simply from "Republicans"? As it appears, 
165. Pete Yost, Grand Jury to Hear New Clinton Case, AsSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 17, 2000. 
166. Pete Yost, Grand Jury Again Looks at Clinton; Gore Backers Blast Timing of News Leak, 
AssOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 18, 2000. 
167. See Susan Schmidt, Judge Was Source of Clinton Jury Story; Leak 'Inadvertent,' Carter 
Nominee Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 19,2000, at Al (reporting Judge Cudahy'S admission). 
168. See Jack Shafer, The Associated Press Plays Dumb, SLATE, at http://slate.msn.com/ 
code/Pressbox/Pressbox.asp?Show=8/22/00&idMessage=5937 (Aug. 22, 2000). 
169. [d. 
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but is not yet completely established because we do not know if Mr. 
Yost was tipped to the story and Judge Cudahy merely confirmed it, if 
the Democrats' speculations about Republican leaking were false, and 
Mr. Yost knew that, was he justified in reporting them? What infer-
ences might careful readers be warranted in drawing from the fact 
that Mr. Yost, who presumably knows the source of his own story, is 
reporting such accusations? Would a reader be correct in assuming 
that Mr. Yost would not print information he (apparently) knew was 
false? This assumption would appear to be incorrect, but absent 
Judge Cudahy's unusual public concession of responsibility, the public 
would not know that. 
Given the spinning dynamic discussed above, one would imagine 
that reporters, and thus readers, are not infrequently faced with such 
questions. Asking reporters to recuse themselves from follow-up sto-
ries regarding their own sources may be impractical and an illusory 
solution in view of their news organizations' probable knowledge of 
the sources. Absent such recusals, however, one might argue that the 
reporters invite a public backlash. While readers may understand re-
porters' unwillingness to disclose their sources, they may come to con-
clude that the media is acting simply as a conduit for leaks and spin, 
with predictable consequences for the credibility of news reports. 
There is a second reason-apart from the accountability and 
credibility concerns discussed above-that I believe sourcing has con-
tinuing importance even where disclosures by anonymous sources are 
later proved factually true. Where the parties are leaking, spinning, 
and attacking each other for the same (Le., when the dynamic de-
scribed in Part II.A is in full swing), it is no longer true that the sourc-
ing of an article matters "only" in providing readers some basis for 
judging the value or credibility of the information offered and thus 
becomes irrelevant once the information is proved accurate. In this 
context, public battle is joined over "leaking"-over the sourcing, as 
well as the facts. The public, one would think, had a right to know 
whether the defense camp's bitter attacks on Mr. Starr's alleged abuse 
of his office through illegal leaking were correct, in whole, in part, or 
not at all. Conversely, the public had an interest in knowing whether 
these charges by the President's defenders were, as members of Mr. 
Starr's office implied, attempts to divert and even obstruct a legitimate 
investigation, or whether they represented the honest outrage of dedi-
cated defenders. The failure of the press to get to the bottom of these 
issues at the time, while continually airing the cycle of lawyerly spin-
ning and leaking, had important consequences. 
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Leaks stories certainly consume a great deal of public attention. 
At the very least, they are (and, some would argue, are designed to be) 
a distraction. Questions of "who told what to whom and when" divert 
scarce resources to largely futile leak-hunts. If one were to tote up the 
amount of time, money, and attention that investigators, lawyers, 
judges, court personnel, executive branch officials, and others de-
voted to the pursuit, discussion, litigation, and adjudication of issues 
relating to leaks in the Lewinsky matter, I am sure that the totals 
would be a disgrace-measured at least in terms of what other crimi-
nal justice ends could have been served with those resources. 
When attributions are not entirely forthright-for example, sug-
gesting that the source of the "leaked" information has a closer nexus 
to the prosecutor than is true-there also exists the possibility that 
leak investigators and courts asked to adjudicate contempt sanctions 
against the government will be misled.170 Even if sanctions are not 
ultimately imposed on an innocent party, the misleading quality of 
attributions may result in litigation that damages innocent persons 
and diverts the parties from the real business at hand-the investiga-
tion and defense of alleged criminal wrongdoing. 
The constant attacks and counter-attacks by counsel for both 
sides also have a very real effect on the lawyering in these cases. The 
charges are no doubt demoralizing to government lawyers, and may 
well deter professional personnel from joining investigations such as 
Mr. Starr's. Further, many tactical decisions regarding how an investi-
gation should be conducted-and, on the defense side, what ap-
proach one should take in responding to it-are influenced to a large 
170. Eds.-The district court, in acquitting Mr. Bakaly, felt compelled to note that it 
found "deeply disturbing" the evidence that Mr. Van Natta attributed to Mr. Starr's staff 
quotes that actually came from the Bates Memorandum, which cited the quoted statements 
as coming from Watergate-era sources. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 117 F. Supp. 2d 6, 25 
n.3 (D.D.C. 2000). The court explained: 
[d. 
Mr. Bakaly has made a persuasive showing that historical debates and quotes were 
lifted verbatim out of the Bates Memorandum and falsely described as present 
day debates within the OIC. The misimpression that this journalistic sleight of 
hand produced is quite troubling for what it shows about the reliability of anony-
mously attributed information. More important for the purpose of the present 
inquiry, the fraudulent attribution of historical information to present day mem-
bers of the OIC could have had an impact on the Court's determination of the 
second prong of [the test for determining whether a prima Jacie showing has been 
made of a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)]. At the prima 
Jaciestage of [that] inquiry, the Court often has no evidence that goes beyond the 
attribution on the face of the article. The use of the redacted Bates Memoran-
dum in the Times article demonstrates how easily the parties and a court can be 
led astray by an inaccurate and misleading attribution. 
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extent by the trust one believes one may repose in the integrity and 
fairness of one's opposing number. The polarizing atmosphere of 
mutual recrimination and distrust will therefore necessarily change 
the parties' decision-making-perhaps in ways that do not always serve 
either the government's or the investigatory target's best interests. 
Finally, the atmosphere of attacks may well, if things get as out of 
control as they did during the Clinton scandals, make the public 
throw up its hands with both sides. Stated in the terms that the com-
batants would use in the heat of the contest, the battle, at its heart, is 
about whether the administration of justice is being subverted by a 
political partisan masquerading as a prosecutor, or whether a presi-
dent charged with administering justice is attempting through scurri-
lous obfuscation to obstruct that administration. Because of the 
perceived special obligations of prosecutors, it would seem that the 
attack campaigns do greater damage to the credibility of the govern-
ment investigation 171 than to the target of the investigation, who may 
be expected to publicly resist imputations of wrongdoing. The evis-
ceration of public confidence in the fair conduct of an investigation 
may extend far beyond the independent counsel at issue, with predict-
ably adverse consequences for public confidence in prosecutors gen-
erally. In any case, to the extent that neither side is vindicated, the 
result is public disgust with a system in which no one seems interested 
in arriving at the truth, or a just result, so much as in playing public 
relations games and scoring points. 
What, then, of the public's "right to know" in this situation, where 
what is at issue is, among other things, the efficient administration of 
justice, the perceived fairness of the investigation, and, at least in 
some circles, the credibility of the press? I, and I assume most mem-
bers of the public, fully understand and support the rationale underly-
ing individual reporters' protection of their confidential sources. 
Journalists' interest in maintaining the confidentiality of their sources 
is both obvious and weighty. Accepting, then, reporters' absolute obli-
171. See, e.g., Editorial, Legal Ethics and Spin, WASH. POST, May 24, 2000, at A36 (stating 
that "[t]he allegations of prosecutorial misconduct did ... divert attention from Mr. Clin-
ton's own behavior and greatly weakened public confidence in Mr. Starr's investigation"); 
Editorial, Mr. Starr and Leaks, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1999, at A24 (opining that "Mr. Starr 
was attacked throughout the Lewinsky episode in a coordinated smear campaign that ac-
cused him publicly of a variety of types of misconduct. These accusations seriously under-
mined his investigation and distracted people from sober discussion either of the 
president's conduct or of Mr. Starr's probe."); id. ("The allegations [of misconduct against 
Mr. Starr] took a great deal of time to investigate and sort out. Now, one by one, they are 
proving meritless, but only long after they have done their job of eroding confidence in his 
investigation.") . 
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gation to preserve the confidentiality of sources to which they have 
promised anonymity, is there anything that reporters can or should do 
to address the above concerns? Should journalists consider the actual 
consequences of their choices when making decisions about whether 
to accept information on a condition of anonymity, whether to go 
with a story based on unidentified sources, or whether to use an attri-
bution that may protect the source, but is less than forthright? 
I wonder, in particular, whether the rationale for a reporter's pro-
tection of her sources should mean that the entire press corps is dis-
abled from pursuing that which is a story of great social import. 
Should all leakers get a pass from all reporters? And, if so, on what 
theory? That if reporters were to successfully go after other reporters' 
sources, leakers will be deterred? Presumably, reporters do not wish 
to kill the fatted calf-singly or collectively-by going after leakers 
and reporting on them.172 Yet in declining these stories, journalists 
are not only declining to inform the public on matters of importance, 
but they are also furthering their own interests by ensuring that both 
leaking and reports about leaking (but not about the actual identity of 
leakers) continue. 
Add, then, to the list of ironies that attend the Clinton scandals 
the fact that the media, in covering matters like the Lewinsky investi-
gation, are subject to some of the tensions that inhere in the difficul-
ties of finding a credible and effective way to investigate alleged 
wrongdoing at the highest reaches of the executive branch. The 
press, like the attorney general, labors under a fairly hefty appearance 
of a conflict of interest. Reporters' conflict lies in their attempt (or 
failure) to report on the leaks that are their bread and butter.173 And 
the press in this situation seems subject to the same trade-off between 
independence and accountability that independent counsel experi-
ence. Reporters' independence and effectiveness in ferreting out 
news-by relying in part on persons they know will leak and lie about 
it and by protecting those persons singly and as a group-is in conflict 
with the accountability of the press to the public. The press's credibil-
172. See, e.g., Kurtz, supra note 143, at Bl (asking "[w]hy ... journalists raise all sorts of 
questions about everyone else's behavior but give themselves a pass when it comes to ob-
taining illicit material" and explaining that "[o]n one level, the answer is obvious: Journal-
ists live off leaks. They are reluctant to bite the hands that keep feeding them. Many 
would just as soon not worry about how the information got to them if it is solid and 
sufficiently juicy."). 
173. See Editorial, Independent Counsel Implosion, WASH. POST, March 13, 1999, at A20 
(opining that "[t]he subject ofleaks is one on which we cannot comment dispassionately. 
Soliciting leaks, after all, is part of what a vibrant free press does. And it would be rather 
hypocritical for an organization that thrives on such disclosures also to denounce them."). 
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ity-which would seem to me at the heart of its mission-depends to 
some extent on how it addresses these tensions in future cases. 
One reporter has assured me that many journalists would em-
phatically disagree with my observations. Their view would be that 
reporters simply are not in the business of making the government, or 
the criminal justice system, function effectively or efficiently. If they 
report well on matters of public concern, that is the extent of their 
obligation. The fact that their reporting may have a pernicious effect, 
or may feed an unfortunate dynamic such as that suggested above, is 
not their concern. Further, their promises to protect their sources are 
ethical or even moral commitments and are not simply the result of a 
pragmatic evaluation of the likely deterrent effect that disclosure 
might have on future sources. Thus, the practical consequences of 
going after other reporters' sources is just not something that they 
would worry about. Journalists do not pursue these stories, I am as-
sured, because they believe that it is not an appropriate mission for 
reporters to report on how other reporters get stories from sources. 
Just as it is none of the government's business who the sources are, it 
is none of the public's business either. Stories about sources and their 
spinning, this view holds, simply aren't newsworthy. 
At bottom, my source and I disagree over whether there is a legiti-
mate public "right to know" in this context. I would submit that even 
if individual reporters believe that such stories are not news the major-
ity of news organizations do. Given the extensive and front-page cov-
erage accorded to reports of leaks, leaks investigations, and the 
accusations of the opposing sides regarding the propriety of those 
leaks, as well as the consequences of this coverage described above, I 
believe there is indeed a manifest public interest in how stories are 
obtained and in the sourcing of the stories. 
3. Consideration of the Impact on Governmental Decisions About 
Whether Alleged Leakers Should Be Sanctioned.-Thus far I have explored 
more general questions regarding the interaction between the press 
and the administration of justice in high-profile cases. Let us return 
to Mr. Bakaly and some of the more specific questions raised by his 
case. Many editorial writers have condemned the decision to refer or 
proceed with the Bakaly prosecution.1 74 What these writers have not 
174. Editorials in the Washington Post and the Washington Times provide adequate exam-
ples. The Post editorialized: 
We don't condone anyone's lying to a court. As we stressed throughout the Clin-
ton-Lewinsky scandal, one cannot waive the duty of candor to the judicial system 
when it is inconvenient. At the same time, it would be truly absurd for Mr. 
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acknowledged is that the above-described dynamic-in which the 
press plays a defining role-made the Bakaly prosecution virtually 
inevitable. 
We do not yet know what motivated Mr. Starr to make the Bakaly 
referral to the Department of Justice. Mr. Starr, who hired Mr. Bakaly 
to talk to the press, could not have been surprised that he had done 
so. Mr. Starr would no doubt state that it was the lies, not the leaks, 
that did in Mr. Bakaly. One may query whether, even assuming that 
falsehoods were uttered, they were so egregious that referral for crimi-
nal prosecution and all that entails was the appropriate response. As 
discussed above, this case, even after it was fully investigated and for-
mally presented at trial, was a very thin one. And Mr. Starr, by virtue 
of his position, was no doubt aware of the enormous personal trauma 
and cost that inevitably befall the subject of a criminal referral. What 
moved Mr. Starr to throw a colleague to the DOJ wolves on such a 
foundation?175 
Bakaly-alone among the figures in the Clinton-Lewinsky ordeal-to be found 
criminally culpable for his behavior. The evidence that he lied is not overpower-
ing. And even were it stronger, the bizarre situation in which he found himself 
presents strongly mitigating circumstances. Mr. Bakaly surely should have been 
more candid when asked about his role. But he has already lost his job over his 
failure to do so. That is a heavier price than President Clinton has paid for far 
more egregious deceptions of the federal courts. 
See, e.g., Editorial, Mr. Bakaly's Tria~ WASH. POST, July 20,2000, atA24. An editorial in the 
Times similarly argued: 
[I]l's hard to summon the requisite outrage to clamor for putting [Mr. Bakaly] 
behind bars .... 
. . . Does the phrase "frivolous case" begin to form in the cranial cavity? As 
even Julian Epstein, the Democratic counsel on the House Judiciary Committee 
and one of Mr. Starr's harshest critics, put it, this is a "terrible" case, a "seman tical 
game of gotcha. There is no real underlying offense here .... " 
Editorial, 'No Underlying Offense,' WASH. TIMES, July 12, 2000, at A22. 
175. At the time of the referral, Mr. Starr's office was "battling [with the DOJ] over how 
[the Department would] conduct a separate disciplinary inquiry into the independent 
counsel's alleged misconduct in the investigation that led to Clinton's impeachment." Ro-
berto Suro, Starr Aide Resigns, May Face Prosecution; Justice Dept. Gets Referral in Leaks Probe, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1999, at AI. The level of animosity between the two offices appeared 
remarkably high, underscoring the extraordinary nature of Mr. Starr's referral of his for-
mer colleague for DOJ investigation. See id. (reporting that "[t]he already tense dealings 
between Starr and the Justice Department reached a new rhetorical pitch yesterday as Dep-
uty Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. angrily dismissed as 'crap' accusations by one of 
Starr's former deputies that disciplinary action against Starr was designed to disrupt Starr's 
investigation of Clinton." And that this response was provoked by Robert J. Bittman, a 
former member of Starr's team, who publicly "accused Justice officials of leaking informa-
tion damaging to Starr and said, 'obviously someone at the department has it in for the 
Office of Independent Counsel'"). 
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It seems to me that the best light one could put on the referral is 
that the OIC had an underdeveloped record and felt enormous pres-
sure to do something-and fast. Because the allegations of OIC leaks 
had played so prominently in the press, and because Mr. Starr had 
issued such strong public denials of improper leaking, the office prob-
ably felt that it had no choice but to refer, and quickly. Mr. Starr's 
referral is not necessarily obviously craven-Mr. Starr would no doubt 
argue that the referral was necessary to guard the credibility of the 
OIC and its eventual result, not to avoid personal criticism. The the-
ory may well have been that the press would report claims that the 
withdrawal of Mr. Bakaly's declaration and a portion of Mr. Starr's 
brief, in the absence of a referral, demonstrated that the OIC con-
doned leaking. No doubt editorials would point out that Mr. Starr, by 
failing to pursue criminal action against Mr. Bakaly, objected to some 
lies to judges-but only those made by the President and not by Mr. 
Starr's own staff.176 All of which would have been entirely appropriate 
commentary, but for, perhaps, the facts. 
Was the media responsible for Mr. Bakaly's predicament? No. 
Obviously there were a number of factors at work. But would this case 
ever have been brought if the controversy over leaks had not been so 
publicly and persistently reported with no resolution of the identity of the 
leakers? In other words, if the press had investigated the leaks as assid-
uously as it did the existence of Ms. Lewinsky's dress, would Mr. 
Bakaly be on trial? That we will never know the answer to this ques-
tion does not make it less worthy of consideration. It certainly points 
up what seems to me evident-that the case against Mr. Bakaly ulti-
mately was about leaking, not lying. 
176. Indeed, in a breathtaking display of chutzpah, on February 2, 1999, the New York 
Times published an editorial excoriating Mr. Starr for debating criminal prosecution of the 
President "at a time when the Senate deserves a calm decision-making atmosphere" and 
calling upon the Senate to "slap Mr. Starr back into line." Editorial, Ken Starrs Meddling, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1999, at A1S. The Times argued: 
Mr. Starr is already regarded by his critics as an obsessive personality. Now he 
seems determined to write himself into the history books as a narcissistic legal 
crank. Once the Senate started the second Presidential impeachment trial in 
American history, that was Mr. Starr's cue not only to shut up but to stop any 
activity by his office that would direct attention away from the Senate or reduce its 
bargaining room. 
[d. Instead of acknowledging that the condemned distraction flowed not from Mr. Starr's 
deliberative activity, but rather from the reporting of it on the front page of the New York 
Times, the Times addressed its own role simply by stating that" [t] he issue of who leaked 
news of Mr. Starr's indictment research to The New York Times is a phony one. What is 
needed here is not an investigation of journalistic sources, but attention to the substance 
of Mr. Starr's legal mischief. It seems designed to disrupt these solemn deliberations into 
Presidential misconduct of a serious if undeniably sordid kind." [d. 
HeinOnline -- 60 Md. L. Rev. 198 2001
198 MARYlAND LAw REVIEW [VOL. 60: 149 
4. Consideration of the Impact on Individuals Threatened with Jail 
Time.-The final layer of considerations raised by Mr. Bakaly's case 
concerns the very specific question of reporters' interaction with-
and perhaps responsibilities to-their leaking sources (or those al-
leged to be the leaking sources). Journalists might well say that they 
cannot be taxed with worrying about the issues discussed above-the 
general systemic consequences of leaks on the administration of jus-
tice, the results of the leak-and-spin dynamic witnessed in high-profile 
cases, or governmental decisions about whether alleged leakers 
should be sanctioned. Yet they may be troubled by the effects that a 
particular decision to obtain and publish information will have on in-
dividuals-especially where a source or a non-source is threatened 
with jail time as a result of a reporter's judgment. 
Those subject to Rule 6(e) and bound by professional and ethical 
obligations may not share much investigatory information. Yet report-
ers may, in most situations, freely obtain and publish it. Absent break-
ing and entering or other obviously illegal means of access,177 
reporters may quite legally receive internal investigative information 
that is not grand jury material. Further, as noted, Rule 6(e) does not 
preclude the recipients of grand jury information from using it. 178 Al-
though individuals not affiliated with the press have been pursued 
criminally under a variety of theories, including obstruction of justice, 
for improperly sharing or soliciting the sharing of grand jury materi-
als,179 I have been unable to find a reported case in which reporters 
have been pursued criminally for inducing persons covered by Rule 
177. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972) (plurality opinion) (stating that 
"lilt would be frivolous to assert-and no one does in these cases-that the First Amend-
ment, in the interest of securing news or otherwise, confers a license on either the reporter 
or his news sources to violate valid criminal laws" and that "[a]lthough stealing documents 
or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy information, neither reporter nor source 
is immune from conviction for such conduct, whatever the impact on the flow of news."). 
178. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
179. See, e.g., United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1272 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming 
defendant grand juror's conviction for conspiracy and obstruction of justice based on his 
disclosure of grand jury information to the investigation's target); United States v. Saget, 
991 F.2d 702, 713 (11th Cir. 1993) (affirming convictions of two investigatory targets for 
obstruction of justice where the targets, when approached by a grand juror, "actively solic-
ited information relating to the grand jury proceedings"); United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 
670, 683 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming convictions for conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and 
theft of government property of a defendant (who was not bound by Rule 6(e) (2» for 
illicitly obtaining and distributing grand jury information); United States v. Howard, 569 
F.2d 1331,1337 (5th Cir. 1978) (affirming the convictions of persons (apparently only one 
of whom was a court reporter covered by Rule 6(e)(2» for obstruction based on a scheme 
to sell grand jury transcripts to targets of an investigation); United States v. Friedman, 445 
F.2d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 1971) (affirming convictions of defendants (some of whom were 
not constrained by Rule 6(e) (2» for conspiracy, contempt, receiving and concealing sto-
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6(e) to disclose materials covered by that rule. Why may reporters do 
without fear that which others may not? 
Although I have found no definitive explanation, one could posit 
many. First Amendment interests spring immediately to mind. Also, 
as a legal matter, prosecutors will likely conclude that, whereas investi-
gatory targets' "need to know" can be deemed a "corrupt" attempt to 
obstruct justice if it causes an invasion of grand jury secrecy, the pub-
lic's "need to know" means that reporters do not have a "corrupt" 
intent in following a story into the grand jury room. It may also be 
that participants in the criminal justice system should be charged with 
a special obligation to adhere to its rules and further its interests. 
Congress and individual prosecutors may be reluctant to expend re-
sources pursuing leaks beyond those persons chargeable with this spe-
cial obligation. They may also be reluctant to antagonize a powerful 
press. Whatever the rationale, the fact remains that while we con-
demn those who leak, we reward those who scoop. 
Should the privilege that reporters enjoy to induce-with proba-
ble impunity-others to breach their ethical, professional, or legal ob-
ligations create a responsibility to those others? When a reporter can 
clear up allegations that the source lied in the course of a leaks investi-
gation, what obligation, if any, does the reporter or the news organiza-
tion have to the source or to the justice system generally? In 
particular, the "reporter's privilege" is said to be held by the reporter, 
not the source. ISO Although this appears to be the law, does this make 
sense? If the source waives the protection of the privilege, what legiti-
mate reason(s) may the press posit for continued silence? 
Many would no doubt argue that leakers leak for their own pur-
poses. They seek to use the press at their peril, and the press owes 
them nothing but accuracy and whatever protection the "reporter's 
privilege" offers in the circumstances. Although reporters offer their 
sources anonymity, they are not responsible for their sources' lies-
even if reporters may recognize that the two often go hand in hand. 
As a public policy matter, the "reporter's privilege" is founded on the 
len government property, and obstruction of justice for a scheme to sell grand jury 
transcripts) . 
180. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695 (stating that "the privilege claimed is that of the 
reporter, not the informant, and ... if the authorities independently identifY the inform-
ant, neither his own reluctance to testifY nor the objection of the newsman would shield 
him from grand jury inquiry, whatever the impact on the flow of news or on his future 
usefulness as a secret source of information"); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 
147 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding that waivers obtained by the Government from its witnesses 
were not effective to remove the privilege because "[t]he privilege belongs to [the news 
organization], not the potential witnesses, and it may be waived only by its holder"). 
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need to avoid deterring informants from providing information to the 
press181 and rendering the press an "investigative arm of the govern-
ment."182 The privilege is not intended to protect leakers from the 
consequences of their actions. Even where a leaker wishes to waive 
the privilege, rather than to hide behind it, many reporters would ar-
gue that she should not have that prerogative. She entered into a deal 
with the reporter and should have understood that that deal included 
absolute protection of the source by the reporter-regardless of 
whether that protection is convenient to the source. Further, if the 
person seeking vindication is not a source, the reporter owes that per-
son nothing. Finally, the press has an institutional interest in resisting 
source-initiated waivers. A reporter may piece a story together using 
multiple sources. If one source wishes to waive the privilege's protec-
tions to demonstrate that she was not the source of a given leak, it may 
imperil the anonymity of the other sources. Still and still, where an 
individual may go to prison because a reporter wishes to rely on the 
privilege, do these arguments sound empty? 
Let us examine in particular one of the counts brought against 
Mr. Bakaly in which he was charged with lying about a statement he 
attributed to Mr. Van Natta. Specifically, the Government charged 
that Mr. Bakaly lied when he stated in his declaration that" 'Mr. Van 
Natta again assured me that he was "working on his sourcing" and that 
he intended to make it clear in his article that his sources were not 
within the OIC."'183 In adjudicating whether this was a false state-
ment, whose testimony-aside from Mr. Bakaly's own-could be more 
central than Mr. Van Natta's? The Times has apparently taken the po-
sition that it will not discuss the sources for the article.184 To my 
knowledge, Mr. Van Natta has not volunteered his view of the accu-
racy of this representation. In cataloguing the ironies of the Bakaly 
case, one should add the possibility that the information that could 
181. See, e.g., Branzhurg, 408 U.S. at 693 (recounting the argument that "[t]he available 
data indicate that some newsmen rely a great deal on confidential sources and that some 
informants are particularly sensitive to the threat of exposure and may be silenced if it is 
held by this Court that, ordinarily, newsmen must testifY pursuant to subpoenas"). 
182. See, e.g., id. at 708-09 (Powell, J., concurring). 
183. Amended Notice, supra note 41, 1( 12(c), at 7 (quoting Bakaly Declaration, supra 
note 16, , 11, at 4). As discussed supra note 46, the Government also charged that Mr. 
Bakaly's actions caused the following false statement to be included in the OIC brief: "'Mr. 
Van Natta further told Mr. Bakaly that all his information came from sources "outside" the 
OIC.'" Id. , 13, at 8 (quoting Opposition Brief, supra note 20, at 13). This count raises 
similar issues. 
184. See Adam Clymer, Justice Dept. Details Its Case Against Former Starr Spokesman, N.Y. 
TIMES, July II, 2000, at A16 ("Editors at the Times have said they do not and will not discuss 
the sources for the article."). 
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vindicate Mr. Bakaly lies in the hands of the press, and it is guarding 
the truth as zealously as any FOIA officer, grand juror, or Pentagon 
official. Just as those guardians do, the press presumably cites an over-
riding public interest in support of its silence-the important reasons 
for recognition of a "reporter's privilege." But just as the press is wont 
to do, it is appropriate to question whether this silence is merely con-
venient, and whether it is consonant with other values. 
The fundamental question is this: what obligation, if any, do Mr. 
Van Natta and the Times have to Mr. Bakaly? As a preliminary maUer, 
one could argue that the parties, if they deemed Mr. Van Natta's testi-
mony sufficiently important, could have subpoenaed him and (absent 
Mr. Van Natta's willingness to be jailed for contempt) secured his tes-
timony even over a claim of privilege. In particular, from an idealistic, 
but not very practical perspective, one could contend that the Govern-
ment, which is supposed to be serving justice and not merely seeking a 
conviction, should have pursued Mr. Van Natta's testimony regardless 
of whether it would inculpate or exculpate Mr. Bakaly. Presumably 
the parties did not subpoena Mr. Van Natta because they did not 
know what he would say. Without the chance to debrief him in ad-
vance of his taking the stand, neither party was willing to ask him to 
try on the bloody glove at trial. It may also be that even if Mr. Bakaly's 
counsel felt fairly confident of what Mr. Van Natta's answer should 
have been, they were still unwilling to call him because of the possibili-
ties that Mr. Van Natta or Mr. Bakaly honestly disagreed or one misre-
membered the conversation at issue. In short, sound lawyering 
precluded calling Mr. Van Natta to the stand without an opportunity 
to talk to him beforehand-an opportunity that apparently was not 
volunteered. Should it have been? 
One may wish to break the question down further and ask if the 
existence of an obligation depends upon whether Mr. Bakaly is inno-
cent or guilty of knowingly making a false statement. Let us begin 
with the assumption that Mr. Bakaly's statement regarding his conver-
sation with Mr. Van Natta was false. Should the New York Times and 
Mr. Van Natta come forward to provide the Government with that 
information? 
To ask the question is probably to answer it. In general, witnesses 
have no legal obligation to volunteer evidence.185 In addition, these 
185. "[Algreements to conceal infonnation relevant to commission of crime have very 
little to recommend them from the standpoint of public policy." BranziJurg, 408 U.S. at 
696. However, the criminal provision used to address this public policy concern-mis-
prison ofa felony, see 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1994)-requires proof of more than a simple failure to 
volunteer relevant infonnation. To prove misprison, the Government must demonstrate 
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witnesses have a weighty interest in not providing such evidence. Pre-
sumably in this circumstance, were the New York Times or Mr. Van 
Natta to volunteer their story, their public-spiritedness would impair 
their future effectiveness. That is, if sources were to understand that 
the press would stand as volunteer witnesses against them if they lie 
about leaking, they may well not leak in the first instance. In other 
words, it is very much in the press's interest to avoid assisting the par-
ties in arriving at the truth where the leaker is a liar. 
What of the public interest here? The press would rightfully 
claim that it cannot effectively do the prosecutor's job and its own. 
The public interest in a conviction must be vindicated by the Govern-
ment and the Government alone so that the press can pursue the pub-
lic interest in news-gathering and reporting. 
Does the result differ in the more distressing circumstance that 
the person on trial is, in fact, telling the truth? Assume that Mr. 
Bakaly accurately recounted the conversation in question. Once 
again, the press may argue that it has no obligation to volunteer infor-
mation and that the obligation to ensure a just result rests with the 
Government, not with the press. These assertions have a decidedly 
less appealing ring when an individual's liberty is at stake. 
Of course, the extent of a reporter's ethical dilemma in this cir-
cumstance depends to some extent on the facts. For example, if Mr. 
Bakaly is accurately remembering the conversation at issue, the extent 
of Mr. Van Natta's testimony on the subject could be brief; he could 
simply state that he did in fact say the things Mr. Bakaly attributed to 
him. The corresponding incursion on the principles underlying the 
"reporter's privilege" would be limited. It would seem, then, that this 
is the strongest case for a volunteered exoneration because it is diffi-
cult to imagine how a reporter's willingness to vindicate his source's 
recollection of a specific conversation would create a disincentive for 
future leakers. 
The consequences of a decision to permit an innocent source to 
waive the privilege may not always be so limited or containable. For 
that "(1) the principal committed and completed the felony alleged ... ; (2) the defendant 
had full knowledge of that fact; (3) the defendant failed to notify the authorities; and (4) 
the defendant took an affinnative step to conceal the crime." United States v. Ciambrone, 
750 F.2d 1416, 1417 (9th Cir. 1985). "'Mere silence, without some affinnative act, is insuf-
ficient evidence' of the crime of misprison of felony. Thus, a person who witnesses a crime 
does not violate 18 U.S.C. § 4 ifhe simply remains silent." Id. at 1418 (citation omitted); see 
also United States V. Adams, 961 F.2d 505,508-09 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[U]nder the misprison 
statute, the defendant must commit an affirmative act to prevent discovery of the earlier 
felony. '[M]ere failure to make known does not suffice.'" (alteration in original) (quoting 
United States v. Warters, 885 F.2d 1266,1275 (5th Cir. 1989))). 
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example, suppose the issue was whether a defendant had lied to inves-
tigators in denying that he was the source of a particular leak. By 
volunteering to exonerate the falsely accused leaker, the reporter may 
well threaten her actual source-either by narrowing the list of poten-
tial candidates or by testifying (obviously under duress) to the name 
of the real leaker. Thus, by vindicating the defendant and serving 
justice, the reporter may, in individual cases, disserve the ultimate in-
terests of her vocation. Similarly, suppose that the case concerned 
one alleged false statement in a leaks investigation and that the re-
porter, in fact, pieced the story together using a number of unnamed 
sources. It is conceivable that the reporter may be forced to discuss all 
of her sources in order to vindicate the one, thus more seriously im-
pairing the credibility of future assurances of anonymity. 
In evaluating these issues, the systemic consequences of individ-
ual decisions cannot be ignored. News organizations may well argue 
that they cannot take case-specific positions based on the innocence 
or guilt of the particular party accused for fear of prejudicing the next 
informant in the next case. Thus, for example, if the media were to 
take the position that it would waive the privilege in order to exoner-
ate those who have been unfairly charged, what would it be implicitly 
communicating when it refuses to waive? Would such refusals be 
deemed tacit admissions that the leaker did, in fact, lie? Although it 
may be difficult to swallow in individual cases, news organizations may 
contend that in order to protect the guilty-and thus safeguard the 
press's interest in encouraging future leakers-the reporter must sac-
rifice the innocent. 
Were a court to address the question, it likely would conclude 
that the defendant's and the criminal justice system's interests are par-
amount. If evaluated solely as a matter of what best serves the press's 
news-gathering interests, it would seem that silence is the appropriate 
course. In my informal poll of journalists, I have discovered an inter-
esting range of opinions. For example, one reporter indicated that 
silence in this context would present no ethical dilemma for many 
journalists. Another opined that where the actual source would not 
be threatened, it would be the right thing to do to seek, in consulta-
tion with the source and probably counsel for the news organization, 
to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
My apologies to those readers who will be frustrated by my unwill-
ingness to stake out an unequivocal position on this issue. I have not 
attempted to resolve this dilemma-or many of the other questions 
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posited in this Article-because I am not sure that there are hard and 
fast answers. I hope, however, that the above discussion provides 
some fodder for conversation about issues that I believe to be impor-
tant legacies of the Clinton scandals. 
